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INTRODUCTION

I am told at times by friends that a judicial opinion has no
business to be literature.
-Benjamin

Cardozo'

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A, University of
Michigan, 1973; LA., University of Michigan, 1978; Ph.D., University of Michigan,
1982; J.D., Yale University, 1989. I wish to thank Lawrence Douglas, John Haley,
Andrew Kaufman, and Lou Wolcher for their comments and suggestions.
1. BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE (1925), reprinted in
SELECTED WRmTNGs OF BENJAMN NATHAN CARDOZO 338, 339 (Margaret E. Hall ed.,
1947).
*
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This Article consists of two related pieces. One piece considers interpretations of Cardozo's opinion in Allegheny College v.
National Chautauqua County Bank.2 Cardozo commonly is
placed among the greatest American judges,3 but his "analysis
in Allegheny College is regularly criticized as contrived and
artificial."4 This Article attempts to resuscitate the reputation
of his analysis by placing the case in its historical and doctrinal
context. The other piece continues the elaboration of a framework introduced in a previous article for thinking about law as
a discipline.5 Central to this framework is a particular conception of the western intellectual tradition in terms of disciplines.6 The notion is that a discipline is at once a science, an
art, and a technology. How are these seemingly disparate pieces
related in this case study? On the one hand, the disciplinary
framework provides a general scheme for examining Cardozo's
opinion. On the other, the analysis of Cardozo's opinion presented here is used to explore the concept of law as an art. The
rest of the Introduction expands the sketch presented thus far.
Cardozo's opinion must be read in the context of the embryonic First Restatement of Contracts (Restatement of Contracts).7 Indeed, this context renders other readings problematic
or untenable. Simply put, my thesis is that Cardozo purposely
injected himself into the debate on the First Restatement 8 by
2.
159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 9-10
3.
(1990) (comparing Cardozo to Judges Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall, Louis
Brandeis, and Learned Hand).
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36
4.
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1379, 1402 (1995).
5.
See Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A
Case Study in InterdisciplinaryLegal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1996).
See id. at 58-64 (describing the development of this framework).
6.
7.
Work on the First Restatement of Contracts began in June 1923 shortly
after the organization of the American Law Institute. See William Draper Lewis, In.
troduction to RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS vii, ix (1932). In September 1928,
the American Law Institute (ALI) Council published a revision of the first 177 sections as an official preliminary draft. See id. at x. Many courts and practitioners
used the official preliminary draft, as well as many of the tentative drafts, before
work began on the final revision. See id. at xi.
As Cardozo apparently made no direct statements about Allegheny College,
8.
the evidence for this assertion is circumstantial and based on a number of observations about Cardozo's interest in contract law and in the Restatement project.
Cardozo did write from time to time about specific opinions. See GEORGE S.
HELLMAN, BENJAMIN N. CARDozo AMERICAN JUDGE 87-88 (1940) (describing correspondence with Arthur L. Corbin concerning De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807
(N.Y. 1917)). Andrew L. Kaufman has informed me, however, that research for his
forthcoming biography on Cardozo (entitled CARDOZO) uncovered no specific writings
about Allegheny College. Telephone Interviews with Andrew L. Kaufman, Professor of
Law, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. (Aug. 21 & 27, 1996) [hereinafter Interviews with Kaufman].
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supporting the Restatement position that reliance can provide a
nonbargain basis for promissory liability.'
The second piece of this Article stems from the assertion
that in an era in which higher education in general and legal
education in particular are undergoing something of an identity
crisis, a starting point for an examination of law's place in the
modern university setting is essential. For the purposes of this
Article, that starting point is the notion of a discipline. The
premise of this notion of discipline is that the basic goal underlying the Western intellectual tradition is to understand,
appreciate, and utilize our environment. Understanding (i.e.,
science) involves classification, appreciation (i.e., art) involves
interpretation, and utilization (i.e., technology) involves the
means for providing sustenance and comfort. The environment,
however, is complex and textured, and thus the intellectual
tradition centers on disciplines-more focused approaches to the
basic goal. A discipline is at once a science, an art, and a technology. A discipline is characterized as a science by the objects
considered, the properties studied, and the classification employed. As an art, a discipline is characterized by the range of
interpretations given and the symbolic medium used. Finally, a
discipline is characterized as a technology by the methods and
scope of its applications. Science, art, and technology work
together within each discipline to present a specific part of a
world view.
To assert that law is a discipline is to assert that law is a
science, that law is an art, and that law is a technology. The
resulting legal world view is not only what makes it possible to
write a book on comparative law, but also what makes it easier
for a lawyer than a mathematician to digest it.
The core of understanding (i.e., science) is classification. I
make no attempt in this Article to provide any classification
scheme for law. I merely assert that classification is the heart
of the scientific component of law as a discipline. That law is a
technology is probably the least controversial of the assertions,
while the assertion that law is an art perhaps is the most appealing-yet the hardest to accept.' °

9. This Article focuses on section 90 of the First Restatement. Other reliancebased sections are beyond the scope of this Article.
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forebearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forebearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise
RESTATEIMT (FrST) OF CONTRACTS § 90.
10. These observations are based on my conversations with colleagues and
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In another article, I commented on law as a science. 1
Here, I have some things to say about law as an art. As with
science, there is no attempt here to exhaust the notion of law
as an art. I merely assert that law can be seen in artistic
terms and offer Allegheny College as an example. In fact, the
disciplinary piece of this Article is the most important, and
future case study articles will continue the discussion of law as
a discipline. Thus, this Article is the second installment of a
work in progress.
How does one relate the seemingly disparate contractual
and disciplinary pieces described above? The disciplinary piece
provides a general scheme for examining the Allegheny College
opinion. Specifically, one might approach the opinion scientifically, artistically, or technologically. As explained below, commentators have adopted all three stances. In this Article, I
consider Cardozo's opinion artistically through an examination
of what Richard Posner has called rhetorical architecture-the
overall structure as it relates to persuasive power. 2
The Allegheny College opinion embraces a subtle and complex architectural framework. The Restatement position is not
supported by straightforward argument, but by adopting an
ironic deference towards the alternative position in such a way
as to erode confidence in its sustainability. The ultimate effect
is reminiscent of that produced by parts of Mark Antony's funeral oration for Julius Caesar." It is important to distinguish
rhetorical architecture from what Posner has called rhetorical
style-the "writing style narrowly conceived.""4 Whereas style
is concerned with word craft per se, architecture embraces the
patterns in which these turns of phrase are set. A brief example involving a well-known writing should make the distinction
clear.'" The Declaration of Independence has the rhetorical
architecture of a logical proof," including its own set of moral
students.
See Townsend, supra note 5, at 68-72 (discussing the meaning of Langdell's
11.
assertion that law is a science).
12. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 126 (defining rhetoric to include Cardozo's
writing style and the architecture of his opinions). The Oxford English Dictionary
offers as the first definition of rhetoric: "The art of using language so as to persuade
or influence others." 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 857 (2d ed. 1989).
13. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2 [hereinafter JULIUS
CAESAR].
14. POSNER, supra note 3, at 126.
15. There is no attempt here to go beyond Posner's framework and offer a systematic treatment of the field of rhetoric, or even the rhetoric of law. Such an endeavor is beyond the scope of this Article. For an introduction, see generally THE
RHETORIC OF LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994) [hereinafter Sarat
& Kearns].
16.

See MORRIS KLINE, MATHEMATICS IN WESTERN CULTURE 329-30 (1953) (ana-
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the persuasive power of the document is enhanced by its rhetorical style, particularly the memorable phrasing.' As just
one example of such phrasing, consider the opening clause:
"When in the Course of human events . .. .",
While the disciplinary piece contained in this Article provides a general scheme for examining the Allegheny College
opinion, the examination of the opinion also sheds light on law
as a discipline. In particular, I use the analysis presented here
to illustrate various aspects of law as an art that are particularly suited for inclusion in a first-year course. The opinion
offers an excellent opportunity to consider the artistic aspects of
legal rhetoric, and the First Restatement context is a good
vehicle for introducing a more hermeneutic feature-elementary
translations into the legal media of fundamental promissory
notions.
Part H contains more detail on the disciplinary framework.
The reader should keep in mind, however, that this framework
will be more fully developed and illustrated in future articles.
Subpart HI(A) describes the reasons for choosing Allegheny
College in this case study. Subpart HI(B) provides the doctrinal
and historical context of the case. Subpart 1I(C) presents the
analysis of Cardozo's rhetorical architecture. Subpart 1H(D)
offers critiques of other readings of Cardozo's opinion.
H. DISCIPLINES AND THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION
Man is a singular creature. He has a set of gifts which make
him unique among the animals: so that, unlike them, he is
not a figure in the landscape-he is a shaper of the landscape.
In body and in mind he is the explorer of nature ....
Man is distinguished from other animals by his imaginative gifts.... So [that] the great discoveries of different ages
and different cultures, in technique, in science, in the arts, express in their progression a richer and more intricate conjunction of human faculties, an ascending trellis of his gifts.
-Jacob

Bronowski'

lyzing the Declaration of Independence and concluding that its structure resembles a
mathematical system).

17.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE parm. 2 (U.S. 1776).

18.
19.
20.

See CARL L. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 194-223 (1942).
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1.
J. BRONowSI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 19-20 (1973).
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In another article, I described a notion of law as a discipline and used this notion to examine one specific area of interdisciplinary legal research.21 The focus of this Article is not
interdisciplinary, but internal to law. The discussion of discipline given here is somewhat truncated; further details can be
found in the earlier article.
The premise for the concept of a discipline used in this
Article is that the basic goal underlying the Western intellectual tradition is to understand, appreciate, and utilize our environment. 3
Understanding refers to science. This use of the word "science" connotes systemization and organization, as opposed to its
more narrow association with what usually are called the natural sciences.24 Science involves the classification of the objects
appearing in the environment according to their important
properties. 5 These objects may be sensory or nonsensory, and
the exact nature of the classification, such as description, prediction, prescription, or explanation, depends on the context.26
This admittedly is an older use of the word "science, "" but it
captures the essence of one of the three basic dimensions of the
intellectual tradition.
Appreciation refers to art. This use of the word "art" connotes aesthetics, as opposed to its more narrow association with
what usually are called the fine arts. Art involves the interpretation of the environment through the creative use of a
symbolic medium. 28 As with the concept of science, I do not
21. See Townsend, supra note 5 (focusing on law as a science and discussing
the legal invocations of the current foundational crisis in mathematics).
22. See id. at 58-60.
23. Nothing said here is meant to imply that other traditions lack these concepts.
24. For a discussion of this distinction, see David A. Funk, Juridical Science
Paradigms as Newer Rhetorics in 21st Century Jurisprudence, 12 N. KY. L. REV.
419, 435 (1985).
See WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 771 (1972) (giving as
25.
one definition "a department of systematized knowledge as an object of study <the
[science] of theology>").
For the purposes of this Article, I am not interested in debates about the
ontology of the objects appearing in the environment.
26. An introduction to a general notion of classification is provided in Stephan
K6rner, Classification Theory, in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 691 (15th ed. 1975).
For more detailed discussions in specific contexts, see CARL G. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 137-71

(1965) (comparing the classification concepts of the natural and social sciences); W.
OF SCIENCE 673-734 (Dover Publications 1958)
(1877) (discussing classification in the natural sciences); THOMAS MUNRO, THE ARTS
AND THEIR INTERRELATIONS 49-109 (1949) (discussing classification in the arts).
STANLEY JEVONS, THE PRINCIPLES

27. Some even view this use as "obsolete." See Barbara J. Shapiro, Law and
Science in Seventeenth-Century England, 21 STAN. L. REV. 727, 727 (1969).
28.

See J. FISHER, REFLECTING ON ART 324 (1993) ("Four major concepts domi-
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attempt to fill out these ideas completely. In particular, no
effort is made to develop the concepts of the artist, the work of
art, and the spectator.2 Nonetheless, as with science and
technology, the intent here is to present notions that cut across
disciplines."
Finally, utilization refers to technology. This use of the
word "technology" is intended to connote application, as opposed
to its more narrow association with what usually are called the
engineering sciences. Technology involves the means employed
to provide sustenance and comfort. 3
The environment is complex and textured, and thus the
intellectual tradition centers on disciplines-more focused approaches to the basic goal described above. A discipline is at
once a science, an art, and a technology.' A discipline is characterized as a science by the objects considered, the properties
studied, and the classification employed. The expression of this

characterization is the corpus or set of significant statements of
the field. As an art, a discipline is characterized by the range of
interpretations and the symbolic medium used. Finally, a discipline is characterized as a technology by the methods and scope
of its applications. Science, art, and technology work together
within each disciplines to present a specific part of a world
view.
nate traditional aesthetics: beauty, representation, expression, and form."); Dewitt H.
Parker, Aesthetics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ARTS 14, 15 (Dagobert D. Runes &
Harry G. Schrickel eds., 1946) ("Three general conceptions of art have dominated the
history of aesthetics: imitation, imagination, and expression or language.*).
29. Any such effort would move far beyond the scope of this Article and into
controversial areas. See generally HUGH CURTLER, WHAT IS ART?. 3 (1983).

30. No attempt is made here to define the term "art"as it is used in connection with music, painting, and the like. Indeed, there is perhaps nothing more problematic. See HORST WOLDEMAR JANSON, HISTORY OF ART 9 (1962). For a discussion

of the problems involved, see Paul Ziff, The Task of Defining a Worh of Art, 62
PHIL. REV. 58 (1953). For a collection of classic perspectives, see FRANK A. TILLMAN
& STEVEN

M. CAHN,

PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND

AES77WICS FROM

PLATO TO

WITTGENSTEIN (1969). For general overviews, see MONROE C. BEARDSLEY, AESTHETICS

FROM CLASSICAL GREECE TO THE PRESENT (1966); MUNRO, supra note 26, at 49-109.
See WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 905 (1972) (defining
31.
technology as "the totality of the means employed to provide ... human sustenance
and comfort").
For another "dimensional" approach to the notion of a discipline, see Tim32.
othy P. Terrell, Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the
Development of Fundamental Normative Principles, 72 CAL. L. REV. 288 (1984).
33. Others posit an antagonistic relationship. Cf DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF
POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 374-77 (1973) (discussing the potential antagonism between
and the cultural [estates]'); THE REPUBLIC OF
"the scientific, the technological ...
PLATO 321-33 (Francis M. Cornsford trans., 1941) (this is the first part of what was
originally Book X) (discussing the potentially corrupting influence of fine arts on the
search for knowledge).
34. What does it mean, after all, to say that students are taught to think like
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Disciplines share certain commonalities because the most
interesting aspects of the environment appear in many different
guises. The resulting interactions manifest themselves in at
least two ways. First, disciplines often are categorized by a
common emphasis or approach to one or more of the three basic
dimensions." There is, for example, the rough division of disciplines into the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the
humanities. Second, and more importantly, disciplines intersect.
To consider just one example, the study of DNA fingerprinting
illustrates how a wide-ranging collection of disciplines (law,
genetics, statistics, etc.) deals with the concept of coincidence."
Interdisciplinary research sharpens the resolution of the
intellectual picture of the environment by applying different
perspectives to the most interesting aspects of the environment.
Moreover, such research is a major force in the creation and
evolution of disciplines themselves. Scholars, however, must be
aware of two basic difficulties in doing meaningful interdisciplinary research: gaining a sufficient understanding of what is
often a foreign discipline, 7 and employing that discipline in a
manner that reflects both its relevance and separateness.38
lawyers? The notion of the separation of disciplines can be traced back at least as
far as Aristotle. See T.Z. LAVINE, FROM SOCRATES TO SARTRE: THE PHILOSOPHIC

QUEST 76 (1984). The current scope and organization of disciplines has been affected
in part by the social and institutional factors that accompanied the transition from
the educated amateur, to the professional society, to the modem research university.
See ROGER L. GEIGER, To ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE: THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES, 1900-1940, at 20-27 (1986) (noting that this process of
professionalization presented all disciplines with the same fundamental issues). For
discussions of the American version of this transition, see THE ORGANIZATION OF
KNOWLEDGE IN MODERN AMERICA, 1860-1920 (Alexandra Oleson & John Voss eds.,

1979); THE PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC: AMERICAN
SCIENTIFIC AND LEARNED

SOCIETIES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE CIVIL WAR

(Alexandra Oleson & Sanborn C. Brown eds., 1976).
35. This classification of disciplines, each of which involves classifications, raises the question of a "metastance." A full discussion of this question is beyond the
scope of this Article.
For a legally-based introduction to the "mete," see Stuart Banner, Please Don't
Read the Title, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 243 (1989). In any case, "groundedness" problems
are nothing new. See, e.g., 1 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 295

(1946) (discussing Aristotle's critique of Plato's theory of universals).
36. For an overview, see National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic
DNA Evidence (rev. ed. 1996).
37. See Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 79, 79-80 (1992) (suggesting that some law professors lack the training
necessary to for the intelligent discussion of foreign disciplines); M.B.W. Sinclair,
Evolution in Law: Second Thoughts, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 31, 32-34 (1993)
(noting the risks involved when legal scholars attempt to explain legal theory using
theories of scientific evolution); Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American
Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV.
1307, 1338 n.140 (1979) (positing that lawyers often underestimate the complexities
of foreign disciplines).
38. See Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law:
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The major intellectual challenge today is fostering meaningful
interdisciplinary work in an information-rich era in which it is
difficult to master even a small part of a given field. The earlier article contains a critique of an area of interdisciplinary
legal research involving purported lessons to be learned by legal
scholars from a sequence of foundational crises in mathematics. 9
To assert that law is a discipline is to assert that law is a
science, that law is a technology, and that law is an art. Consider each assertion in turn. The core of understanding (i.e.,
science) is classification. It is what makes it easier for a lawyer
than a mathematician to digest a book on comparative law.
There is no attempt here to provide any classification scheme
for law. The assertion is merely that classification is the heart
of the scientific component of law as a discipline."
The idea that law involves classification is nothing new.
Classification is an important part of both the common and
civil law traditions.41 Moreover, classification is an important
part of the jurisprudential movements that have shaped current
American legal academics.42 This idea of law as a science is
Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J.
191, 193-94 (1991) (stating that "because of the radically different structures of authority in law and the humanities, the hope that humanistic theory will be able to
provide a source of intellectual authority for law is largely a vain one*); David R.
Dow, Gadel and Langdell-A Reply to Brown and Greenbere's Use of Mathematics in
Legal Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 716-24 (1993) (concluding that "Illegal theory
must scavenge from only those disciplines that are fundamentally like our ovvn";
Robin L. West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation:Some Reservations About the Lawas-Literature Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 277 (1987) (arguing that legal scholars too often fail to account for the important differences between literature and
law).
39. See Townsend, supra note 5.
40. For an exhaustive and provocative account of classification in law, see Jay
M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L REV. 661 (1989).
41. See 5 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 43-69 (1959) (outlining a variety of
schemes regarding classification in both the common and civil law).
42. This is most certainly true in work predating appeals to the social sciences.
For a discussion of some of the legal movements predating such appeals, see JAMES
E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970: A HISTORY 8-116 (1990).

According to G. Edward White, the social science-based movements include: (1)
the sociological jurisprudence movement, (2) the legal realist movement, (3) the law,
science, and policy movement, (4) the legal process movement, and (5) the law and
society movement. See G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A
Truncated Intellectual History, 40 Sw. L.J. 819, 821, 825, 827, 830 (1986) (discussing
legal realism; the law, science and policy movement; process jurisprudence; and the
law and society movement); G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to
Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58
VA. L. REv. 999, 999 (1972) (stating that legal realism succeeded sociological jurisprudence).
These later movements embraced classification as well. See HENRY M. HART,
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 141-60 (1958) (describing the legal
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explored more in the previous article." That law is a technology is perhaps the least controversial of the assertions. That law
is an art is the assertion that is perhaps the most appealing,
yet the hardest to accept." This last assertion is the focus
here.
Commentators have examined Allegheny College in terms of
all three dimensions. John Murray has stated that, "if forced to
use only one judicial opinion" to examine the general doctrine
of promissory liability, "this author, in his capacity as a teacher
of contract law, would, without hesitation, choose the Allegheny
College opinion.""4 In the terminology of this Article, Murray
would be using Allegheny College to discuss the scientific component of law by examining the legal pigeonholes used to describe the various bases of promissory liability. Other authors

process movement); 5 POUND, supra note 41, at 21, 69-75 (discussing classification
from the perspective of the sociological jurisprudence movement); WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 31 (1968) (discussing the subject matter and
purposes of legal realist classification); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal,
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52
YALE L.J. 203, 243-89 (1943) (propounding the law, science, and policy movement
classification scheme); Robert B. Yegge, President's Message, Law and Sociology, 4 L.
& Soc'Y REV. 327, 327-28 (1970) (sketching the law and society movement).
See Townsend, supra note 5, at 68-72.
43.
For one discussion of law as an art, see Laura S. Fitzgerald, Note, To44.
wards a Modern Art of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 2051 (1987).
JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 240 n.94 (3d ed. 1990).
45.
Murray elaborated in the Teacher's Manual for his casebook:
An introduction to the validation process is new in this edition. In the
third edition, there is an introduction to remedies which is continued in this
edition. In an attempt to react effectively to the perennial problem of dealing with every fundamental concept before every other fundamental concept,
I found myself introducing the validation process in the introductory sessions
of my contracts class .... [This section] provides a suitable vehicle for this
very basic introduction. It is accomplished through a few pages of textual
treatment, by simple problems ... and the classic opinion by Benjamin
Cardozo in the Allegheny College case. I find [the problems] more than adequate to allow the student to deal effectively with the Allegheny College case
which follows some further discussion of [the Restatement] and text. I have
often said that if forced to deal with the entire validation process through
one case, I would choose Allegheny College which presents some of the history of consideration . . . and the embryonic development of promissory estoppel .... The . . . problems plus the classic Cardozo opinion are quite sufficient to introduce the student to the fundamental idea of the validation process which accomplishes three results: (1) the student is not mystified by an
incidental question or discussion about the validation process in cases concentrating on the agreement process . . . (2) the student is aware of the
necessity of a validation device in every contract . .. (3) when the student
arrives at the comprehensive analysis of the validation process ... the
coverage . . . is materially assisted by the basic introduction and awareness
created [here].
JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 3-5 (4th ed. 1991).
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have characterized the opinion in terms of the pragmatic aspects of Cardozo's legal philosophy.46 Allegheny College often is
cited as an example of "Cardozo's commitment to the elevation
of a realistic approach" to judging that goes beyond "the technicalities of precedent and doctrine." 7 According to Prakash
Mehta, Allegheny College is "used to teach first year law students the functional aspects of how lawyers must think."5 In
the terminology of this Article, the teachers described by Mehta
are using Allegheny College as part of the consideration of law
as a technology. Finally, other authors have discussed judicial
opinions in terms of what is here called law as an art."
Indeed, Cardozo's opinions often are analyzed for their literary
aspects,"0 and there are several studies of the Allegheny
46.
For discussions of the pragmatic aspects of Cardozo's legal philosophy, see
BERYL HAROLD LEVY, CARDozo AND FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THINKING 21, 25, 70
(1938); POSNER, supra note 3, at 20-32; Cunningham, supra note 4, at 1398-1406.
For general discussions of Cardozo's legal philosophy, see Edwin W. Patterson.
Cardozo's Philosophy of Law (pts. 1 & 2), 88 U. PA. L. REV. 71, 156 (1939); Henry
Marvin Holland, Jr., The Juristic Philosophy of Justice Cardozo: A Study in Mediation (1958) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington) (on file ,ith author).
47.
Andrew L. Kaufman, Judging New York Style: A Brief Retrospective of Two
New York Judges, in 1988 YEARBOOK OF THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY
60, 65 (1988).
48.
Prakash Mehta, Note, An Essay on Hamlet: Emblems of Truth in Law and
Literature, 83 GEO. L.J. 165, 181 (1994); see also Cunningham, supra note 4, at
1398, 1402-03 (offering the opinion as an example of Cardozo's pragmatism); Alan
Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal
Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295, 317 n.61 (1988) (stating that Allegheny is an
example of a realist judge using manipulative formalism to achieve functional results); Benjamin Andrew Zelermeyer, Note, Benjamin N. Cardozo: A Directive Force
in Legal'Science, 69 B.U. L. REV. 213, 225-26 (1989) (stating that Cardozo used the
case to advance social welfare); Editorial Note, 2 U. CIN. L. REv. 287, 299 (1928)
[hereinafter CINCINATrI NOTE] (finding Allegheny College "justified upon social considerations").
49.
For some discussions of literary approaches to judicial opinions, see generally RicHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 269316 (1988); Lawrence Douglas, Constitutional Discourse and Its Discontents:An Essay
on the Rhetoric of Judicial Review, in Sarat & Kearns, supra note 15, at 225; Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201
(1990); Walker Gibson, Literary Minds and Judicial Style, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915
(1961); Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy
Budd, Sailor with an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1982);
James Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REV. 835 (1986); Irving Younger,
On Judicial Opinions Considered as One of the Fine Arts, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 341
(1980).
50. For discussions of Cardozo's opinions as art, see FRANCIS BERGAN, THE
HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, 1847-1932, at 248-52 (1985); LEVY,
supra note 46, at 83-96; KARL N. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 430-45 (1960); POSNER, supra note 3, at 33-57, 126-28; Anon Y. Mous,
The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 VA. L. REV. 625 (1943) (This article
was written by Justice Jerome N. Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, see
Paul Brickner, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo: A Fresh Look at a Great Judge, 11
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College opinion devoting substantial effort to its artistic aspects."'
Cardozo's opinion can be seen in terms of all three disciplinary dimensions, and this illustrates an aspect of working
together that goes beyond the purely symbiotic." Here, the
same activity is simultaneously scientific, artistic, and technological. For the purposes of this Article, I wish to focus on the
artistic features of Allegheny College.

III. ALLEGHENY COLLEGE
A.

Why Allegheny College?
Perhaps one of Cardozo's artifacts on consideration is enough
for any casebook, but at least one should be required literature.
-John

3
Dawson, William Harvey & Stanley Henderson

There are two basic reasons to choose Allegheny College for
a discussion of law as an art. First, Cardozo had an appreciation of law's artistic dimension and its relation to the scientific
and technological dimensions. Second, Allegheny College is a
celebrated case, often cited in mainstream legal commentary,
and hence the ideas presented here can be integrated easily
into a first-year course.
With respect to the first reason, Cardozo was a pioneer in
the consideration of the artistic aspects of judicial writing; in
his noted essay Law and Literature, he offered the following
sentiments:
[The judge] is expounding a science, or a body of truth which
he seeks to assimilate to a science, but in the process of
exposition he is practicing an art. The Muses look at him a
bit impatiently and wearily at times. He has done a good deal
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1, 17-18 (1984)); Bernard L. Shientag, The Opinions and Writings
of Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 597, 598-601 (1930); Richard H.
Weisberg, Law, Literature and Cardozo's Judicial Poetics, 1 CARDOzo L. REV. 283
(1979); Arthur Jess Wilson, A Guide to the Literary and Philosophic Genius of
Cardozo, LAW STUDENT, Mar. 1939, at 8.
51. See, e.g., Alfred S. Konefsky, How to Read, or at Least Not Misread,
Cardozo in the Allegheny College Case, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 645 (1987); Leon S. Lipson,
The Allegheny College Case, YALE L. REP. 8 (Spring 1977); Mehta, supra note 48, at
179-82.
52. In the earlier article, I gave examples of the symbiotic aspect in the context of mathematics. See Townsend, supra note 5, at 62-63 nn.34-43.
53.

JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CONTRACTS

CASES AND COMMENT 66 (6th ed. 1993).
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to alienate them, and sometimes they refuse to listen, and are
seen to stop their ears. They have a strange capacity, however, for the discernment of strains of harmony and beauty, no
matter how diffused and scattered through the ether. So at
times when work is finely done, one sees their faces change,
and they take the worker by the hand. They know that by the
lever of art the subject the most lowly can be lifted to the
heights. Small, indeed, is the company dwelling in those upper
spaces, but the few are also the elect.'
He went on to single out rhetorical style and rhetorical
architecture."s Cardozo's essay concentrates on rhetorical style,
going so far as to offer something of a classification of various
stylistic techniques:
Classification must be provisional, for forms run into one another. As I search the archives of my memory, I seem to discern six types or methods which divide themselves from one
another with measurable distinctness. There is the type magisterial or imperative; the type laconic or sententious; the type
conversational or homely; the type refined or artificial, smelling of the lamp, verging at times upon preciosity or euphuism;
the type demonstrative or persuasive; and finally the type
tonsorial or agglutinative, so called from the shears and the
pastepot which are its implements and emblem.'
The essay also makes the following tentative comments
about rhetorical architecture:
I have touched lightly, almost not at all, upon something more
important than mere felicities of turn or phrase. Above and
beyond all these are what we may term the architectonics of
opinions. The groupings of fact and argument and illustration
so as to produce a cumulative and mass effect; these, after all,
are the things that count above all others. I should despair,
however, of any successful analysis of problems at once so
large and so difficult within the limits of this paper. One
needs a larger easel if one is to follow such a map.'
In addition to his recognition of some of law's artistic aspects, Cardozo also noted that the artistic, scientific, and

54. Id. at 356.
55. Cardozo's notion of rhetoric embraced the Aristotelian view of rhetoric as
persuasion in its highest sense. See Weisberg, supra note 49, at 313. For a discussion of the Aristotelian view, (which sees rhetoric as essential in argument where
the meaning of an event is at issue) as well as the competing Platonic and Socratic
views of rhetoric (which see rhetoric merely as the tricks of an orator), see Douglas,

supra note 49, at 225-26.
56.

CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 342.

57.

Id. at 352.
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technological dimensions work together. For example, to those
58
who might have an "amused or cynical indifference" to the
idea that a judicial opinion can be regarded as a type of literature, Cardozo responded:
We are merely wasting our time, so many will inform us, if
we bother about form when only substance is important. I
suppose this might be true if only one could tell us where substance ends and form begins. Philosophers have been trying
for some thousands of years to draw the distinction between
substance and mere appearance in the world of matter. I
doubt whether they succeed better when they attempt a like
distinction in the world of thought. Form is not something
added to substance as a mere protuberant adornment. The two
are fused into a unity ....

The argument strongly put is not

the same as the argument put feebly any more than the
"tasteless tepid pudding" is the same as the pudding served to
us in triumph with all the glory of the lambent flame. The
strength that is born of form and the feebleness that is born
of the lack of form are in truth qualities of the substance.
They are the tokens of the thing's identity. They make it what
it is.59

As the previous quotations indicate, Cardozo argued that
art is a necessary, as opposed to a contingent, feature of effective legal writing. 0 Thus there is little doubt that Cardozo
should be considered when looking for opinions artfully crafted
to produce a "cumulative and mass effect""' on the reader.
Even a fellow judge noted his "persuasive charm of language."82 The joy Cardozo found in the artistic aspects of judicial opinions can be seen in his description of the writing of
Oliver Wendell Holmes:
Law in his hands has been philosophy, but it has been literature too. If any one has ever been sceptical of the transfiguring power of style, let him look to these opinions. They will
put scepticism to flight. How compact they are, a sentence
where most of us would use a paragraph, a paragraph for a
page. What a tang in their pointed phrases; what serenity in
their placid depths; . . . what a glow and a gleam when they

become radiant with heat.'
58.
59.

Id. at 339.
Id. at 339-40.

60.

See Weisberg, supra note 49, at 292 (stating that Cardozo thought effective

law had a strongly aesthetic nature).
CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 352.
61.
Irving Lehman, The Influence of Judge Cardozo on the Common Law, 35 L.
62.
LIBR. J. 2, 2 (1942). Lehman served with Cardozo and later became the Chief Judge
of the Court of Appeals of New York. See id.
Benjamin N. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 682, 689
63.
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Turning to the second reason for choosing Allegheny College, the decision gained fame soon after it was delivered in
1927, and that fame continues to the present day: the case
immediately appeared in the American Law Reports, Annotated,' and it generated numerous case notes -- leading one observer to note that "[t]he case was the subject of much comment in the law reviews throughout the country at the time.'
A 1930 Columbia Law Review tribute to Cardozo states that "to
the student of legal history [Allegheny College] ... offers much
food for thought and reflection."' Even today the case is a
first-year staple, and it is treated in many casebooks.c' Such
popularity makes it easy to use the case to introduce first-year
students to the concept of law as an art.
B. Allegheny College: The Background
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
-RESTATEMENT

(FiRST) OF CONTRACTS section 90'

This subpart provides the historical and doctrinal context of
Allegheny College. In particular, this subpart describes the Restatement project and Cardozo's interest therein, and sketches
the history of the Restatement of Contracts section 90-the
main provision for reliance as a basis for promissory liability."
This context is the starting point for the analysis of Cardozo's
opinion presented in subpart 1I1(C). The premise of the analysis

(1931).
64. 57 A.L.R. 980 (1928).
65. See, e.g., Henry W. Humble, Promissory Estoppel in the Law of Contracts,
63 AM. L. REV. 33 (1929); Elbert H. Carver, Note, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 270 (1928);
Case Note, 37 YALE L.J. 823 (1928) [hereinafter YALE NOTE]; CINCINATr NOTE,
supra note 48, at 295-97; Editorial Note, 13 IOWA L. REV. 332 (1928) [hereinafter
IOWA NOTE]; Note, 27 MICH. L. REV. 88 (1928); Note, 12 MNN. L. REV. 643 (1928)
[hereinafter MINNESOTA NOTE]; Morris Pottish, Note, 5 N.Y.U. L. REv. 153, 161
(1928); Recent Case, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 749 (1928).
66. Recent Decision, 18 CAL. L. REV. 314, 316 (1930).
67. Shientag, supra note 50, at 631.
68. Of the 13 contracts casebooks examined by Cunningham, Allegheny College
is a main case in six and a note case in two others. See Cunningham, supra note 4,
at 1459.
69. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90.
70. There are a number of other reliance-based sections of the First Restatement, but they are beyond the scope of this Article.
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is that Cardozo purposely injected himself into the debate over
the Restatement's position that reliance could provide a
nonbargain basis for promissory liability. What Cardozo did in
Allegheny College was to support the Restatement's position by
juxtaposing various theories of promissory liability to produce
an effect reminiscent of that created by Mark Antony's funeral
oration for Julius Caesar.7 The context is also important for
the critiques of other readings of Allegheny College offered in
subpart III(D). Indeed, the context renders these other readings
problematic or untenable.
The Restatement project has its roots in what James
72
Herget has called the "drive for classification," a general
movement towards systemization that characterized western
73
legal systems in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The motivations for this movement ranged from desires to bring the law
into the Age of Reason74 to more practical concerns about legal
uniformity in complex federal systems. 5 That is, the motivations included what are termed in this Article scientific and
technological concerns. The drive took a number of forms in the
7
United States, including the reformation of legal education, "
77
the creation of the American Bar Association, and the codifi78
cation and Restatement projects.
The Restatement project represents a nonstatutory attempt
on the part of the legal community to provide systemization for
various parts of the common law.79 In 1921, the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) adopted a resolution directing
the appointment of an organizing committee whose job would
be to bring together various lawyers, judges, and professors to
"create a permanent organization for the improvement of

JULIUS CAESAR, supra 13, act 3, sc. 2.
71.
72. HERGET, supra note 42, at 63.
73. See id. at 63-81.
74. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 403-07 (2d ed.
1985) (noting that the common law seemed unwieldy and shapeless to late nineteenth century observers).
See HERGET, supra note 42, at 65-66 (discussing the drive toward uniformi75.
ty between the states).
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 405.
76.
See id. at 407; Gene R. Shreve, History of Legal Education, 97 HARV. L.
77.
REV. 597, 600 (1983) (book review) (reporting that the American Bar Association was
founded in 1878 by the practicing bar).
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 403-07. Commentators have differed on
78.
the evolutionary details. Compare id. at 676 (describing the Restatement movement
as a hostile reaction to the codification movement), with Nathan M. Crystal, Codifi.
cation and the Rise of the Restatement Movement, 54 WASH. L. REV. 239, 239, 243,
267, 273 (1979) (describing the Restatement movement as sympathetic to, and an
outgrowth of, the codification movement).
79. See HERGET, supra note 42, at 65-78.

1996]

LAW AS AN ART

1119

law.""° One of the major tasks of this organization was to be
the Restatement project.8 In 1922, the committee brought together a group whose work resulted the next year in the formation of the American Law Institute (ALI).'
The plan for the Restatement project was as follows. The
ALI's Executive Committee would appoint Reporters and Committees of Advisers who would have primary responsibility for
producing Restatement drafts.' These drafts would be revised
in conjunction with the ALI Council before being submitted for
discussion at the annual ALI meetings.' Following these discussions, the drafts would be submitted to the Council and full
ALI membership for final adoption.' The Restatement of Contracts was begun in June 1923 and was finally adopted in
1932.86

Cardozo was a great supporter of the Restatement effort."
He devoted the first of his 1923 Storrs lectures to describing
the reasons for the project:
There was the lack of agreement on the fundamental principles of the common law; lack of precision in the use of legal
terms; conflicting and badly drawn statutory provisions; attempted distinction between cases where the facts present no
distinction in the legal principles applicable; the great volume
of recorded decisions; ignorance of judges and lawyers; the
number and nature of novel legal questions."
Cardozo had "great faith in the power of such a restatement to unify our law." 9 It would "prove a potent force in
bringing certainty and order out of our wilderness of precedent."' Moreover, it would "enable us to reckon our gains and
80. See William Draper Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and the
First Restatement of the Law, How We Did It, in RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS 1-3
(American Law Institute, Permanent ed. 1945) [hereinafter How WE DM IT].
81. See N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins
of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HIST. REV. 55, 70-74 (1990).
82. See Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the
American Law Institute, 15 IOWA L. REv. 19, 20 (1929).
83. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 25 (2d ed. 1990); How WVE DID IT,
supra note 80, at 5-6.
84. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 25; How WE DID IT, supra note 80, at 6.
85. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 25; How WE DID IT, supra note 80, at 6.
86. See RESTATE~mr (FRST) OF CONTRACTS ix, xi.
87. See LEVY, supra note 46, at 96-97 (describing Cardozo's support of the Restatement series as "hearty"); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE
LAW: CARDOZO, HOLAiEs, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASK 147

(1976) (describing Cardozo's support of the Restatement series as "devoted").
88. BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, reprinted in SELECTED
WRInNGs OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo 185, 187 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).
89. Id. at 189.
90. Id. at 192.
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9
losses, strike a balance, and start afresh."
Not everyone supported the ALI's endeavor. At the 1924
ALI dinner, Cardozo felt compelled to respond to critics who
argued, as he put it, that restating a particular area of common
law would "sterilize and whither" the law, would be "a one-man
job like the one-man opinions we hear in appellate courts," and
92
would be "obsolete when ... finished." For Cardozo, the project held "the promise of a great hope, a promise9 which it
would be cowardice to shirk, and treason to betray."" Cardozo
spoke with such intensity and with such eloquence that Chief
Justice Taft, who presided at the dinner, was moved to say:
I am sure that every one who has had the privilege of hearing
and following the distinguished jurist in this beautiful, powerful, analytical address, in which he gives us the reasons for
the faith that is in him in this great work, rejoices that he
has been here.94
Cardozo was more than just a cheerleader for this great
work. At the 1921 AALS meeting creating the organizing committee, Cardozo gave a pivotal speech defusing the opposition of
incoming AALS President John Hall of the University of Chicago, who criticized the scope of the proposed Restatement project.95 Cardozo went on to play a fundamental role in the formation of the ALI, serving as Vice President and Executive
Committee member for the ALI's first eight years and on its
9
Council until shortly before his death. " In98 addition, Cardozo
worked on the Restatement (First) of Torts.

Id. at 193.
91.
Minutes of the Second Annual Meeting and Addresses at the Second Annual
92.
Dinner, 2 A.L.I. PROC. 106 (1924).
93. Id. at 112.
94. Id. at 93, 113.
See Hull, supra note 81, at 73 (describing Cardozo as having co-opted Hall
95.
while at the same time discrediting his motives).
See NOONAN, supra note 87, at 147.
96.
See HOW WE DID IT, supra note 80, at 27-32 (providing tables showing
97.
Cardozo as a Vice President from 1923-1931, a member of the Executive Committee
for that same period, and showing Cardozo as a council member until his resignation in May of 1937, prior to his death in July of 1938).
98. Cardozo's name appears as an Adviser only for the first tentative draft of
the Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1925). Nonetheless, he attended "a very considerable number" of torts committee
meetings before his elevation to the United States Supreme Court in 1932. 1 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS xii-xiii (1934). According to Kaufman's forthcoming
biography, Cardozo served more in the capacity of an unofficial adviser. Interviews
with Kaufman, supra note 8; see Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 ILL. L. REV.
582, 582 (1935) (describing Cardozo as a critic rather than a drafter).
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There is every reason to believe that Cardozo was interested in the success of the Restatement of Contracts. The ALI had
decided to make the Restatement of Contracts a top priority. It
was hoped that Reporter Samuel Williston could use his influential treatise to complete a large portion of the Restatement in
quick order, thereby giving the ALI visibility and credibility at
an early date.99 And if his reputation is any guide to his interest, one only need note that Cardozo probably is remembered
best for his contracts and torts opinions.' 0 In fact, Restatement (Second) of Contracts Reporter E. Allan Farnsworth has
listed Cardozo as one of the judges who had a "special influence
on contract law."' ° '
This subpart closes with a history of the Restatement's
main treatment of reliance and promissory liability. The traditional history of the initial drafting of this treatment comes
from Grant Gilmore's twenty-year-old memories of Arthur
Corbin's twenty-year-old recollection of events." At the time of the drafting of the Restatement, it was understood that there is a class of promises for which liability is
based on the formal character of the promissory statement.'03
Such promises include, for example, those made under seal."0
These were to be handled in the Restatement by a collection of
sections dealing with so-called formal contracts."0 5 There also
is a class of informal promises, for which liability cannot be
predicated on the formal character of the promissory statement.' The black-letter maxim held that such promises could
be enforced only if supported by a consideration." 7 What,
however, is consideration?
Gilmore relates that when it came time to deal with the
class of informal promises, Williston proposed defining consideration as something bargained for and exchanged for the promise.' o Such a definition would in effect enshrine the position

99. See 1 A.L.I. PROC. app. 1 at 62-63, app. 2 at 92-94.
100. See Kaufman, supra note 47, at 63.
101. FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 957; see also Cunningham, supra note 4, at
1380, 1384.
102. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 128 n.135 (1974).
103. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON'S TREATISE ON THE

LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1930) (a student edition of Williston's 1920 treatise) [hereinafter SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON].
104. See id.

105. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (listing the types of formal
promises). But see id. § 7(a) cmt. a (noting that many states have statutes rendering
obsolete the Restatement treatment of the seal).
106. See SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON, supra note 103, §§ 12, 99.
107.
108.

See id
See GILMORE, supra note 102, at 62. Williston proposed what became § 75
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taken by Oliver Wendell Holmes that Anglo-American contract
law fundamentally was based on bargain.'09 Corbin, a Special
"
Adviser and Reporter for the Chapter on Remedies, ' then
argued that Williston's proposal could not explain, for example,
cases in which courts held the promisor liable based on
unbargained-for acts performed by the promisee in reliance on
the promise.1 ' Corbin therefore proposed a broader definition
of consideration."' According to Gilmore, Williston won the
battle on the definition of consideration, but lost the war on
liability when forced to concede that Corbin's cases would have
to be addressed."' The result was a collection of sections appearing under the title "Informal Contracts Without Assent Or
Consideration.""' Most important for the purposes of this Article is the eventual section 90 on reliance quoted at the beginning of this subpart."'
The remaining sections grouped with section 90 deal mainly
with certain other narrow exceptions to the requirement of a
bargain in the case of informal promises,"' but according to
Gilmore, "The extent to which [reliance] was to be allowed to
17
In
undercut [bargain] was left entirely unresolved."'
"schizophrenic
the
of
example
one
is
this
Gilmore's view,

of the Restatement, which says: "[C]onsideration for a promise is (a) an act other
than a promise, or (b) a forebearance, or (c) the creation, modification or destruction
of a legal relation, or (d) a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for
the promise."

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 75(1).

109. See GILMORE, supra note 102, at 61-63. Holmes's position is laid out in the
contracts section of his famous lectures on the common law. See OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 230 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963).
See How WE DID IT, supra note 80, at 34, t.8.
110.

111.
112.
113.

See GILMORE, supra note 102, at 63-64.
See id. at 63.
See id. at 64-65.

114.

See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS Topic 4.

115. See id. § 90. This section had various numbers during the drafting process.
I use the final First Restatement number for this and other Restatement sections.
The Second Restatement modifies section 90 in ways that are unimportant for
the purposes of this Article. For a general discussion of these modifications, see
Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52 (1981).
116. These exceptions involve promises to pay a debt barred by the statute of
limitations (section 86), promises to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy (section
87), promises to waive a condition (section 88), promises to perform a voidable duty
(section 89), and stipulations in pending court proceedings (section 94). See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §§ 86-89, 94.

Comment a to section 89 notes that some states enforced promises made without consideration but based on past circumstances not covered by 86-89. See id.
§ 89, cmt. a. This comment developed into the current Second Restatement section
86 treating promises made in recognition of a previously received benefit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 reporter's note (1981).

117.

GILMORE, supra note 102, at 64.
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quality" 11 ' of the Restatement that can be traced to the fact
that "Williston and Corbin held antithetical points of view on

almost every conceivable point of law.""'
Yet as recent scholarship suggests, it appears that some-

thing is left out of the traditional story.'

Even Gilmore con-

ceded that "there is bound to be a certain amount of slippage

between what really happened and this second-hand reconstruction of what happened."' A different story begins with the
rise of general theories of promissory liability.
A general theory of promissory liability did not appear in
the American legal tradition until sometime in the late 18th or
Before that time, commentators and
early 19th century.'
scholars had focused on the individual bases of specific forms of

action such as debt, covenant, and assumpsit.

A debt action,

for example, was not even conceived of as redressing a breach
of promise, but rather as allowing a creditor to recover the debt
that the debtor had granted to the creditor."
In the 19th century, several general theories of promissory
liability emerged. Early on there was a Kantian theory that
based liability on individual will-a promise was enforceable
because the promisor had willed herself to be bound by the
By the end of the century, however, this theory
promise.'
had been replaced by the Holmesian theory emphasizing

118. Id. at 64-65.
119. Id. at 60.
120. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of Anthology, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1406, 1457 (1987) (stating that Williston's position on reliance in his
treatise "stands in sharp contrast" to the view that has been attributed to him by
the Gilmore account); see also Michael Gibson, Promissory Estoppel, Article 2 of the
U.C.C. and the Restatement (Third) of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 659, 668-69 n.75
(1988) (stating, "[c]ontemporary evidence, however, suggests that Williston was less
opposed to the inclusion of [section 90] than Gilmore implies," and noting Williston's
acceptance of the doctrine in his treatise); James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83
CAL. L. REV. 547, 566-67 (1995) (questioning the accuracy of the Gilmore account
because a predecessor to section 90 appeared even in early drafts); Joshua P. Davis,
Note, Cardozo's Judicial Craft and What Cases Come to Mean, 68 N.Y.U. L REV.
777, 801-02 (1993) (noting a 1913 article by Henry Ballentine stating that Williston
endorsed some reliance-based doctrine); Daniel J. Klau, Note, What Price Certainty?
Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 511, 533-39
(1990) (citing an unpublished letter by Corbin that conflicts with Gilmore's account
by stating that he and Williston worked together to include section 90).
121. GUIORE, supra note 102, at 128 n.135.
122. For the purposes of this Article, contractual liability is identified with
promissory liability. For a brief discussion of this assertion, see FRIEDRICH KESSLER
ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 112-13 (3d ed. 1986).

123.

See id. at 113.

124. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE
RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT 67-68 (1975).

125.

See FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 43.
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bargain. 12 In the latter half of the 19th century, there arose
hints of another theory, one focusing on reliance by the promisee.
Such theories of promissory liability can be used to introduce first-year students to something of a hermeneutic feature
of law as an art. These theories represent elementary translations into the legal media of (some of the) typical answers given
(by students) to the question of why particular promises should
be kept: (1) "You gave your word!" (Kantian Theory); (2) "We
had a deal!" (Bargain Theory); (3) "I relied on you!" (Reliance
Theory). On the other hand, students should be warned that it
would be dangerous to conclude that (contract) law in general
had (or even has) a self-conscious recognition of law's artistic
component or that the average turn-of-the-century legal scholar
considered promissory liability in the terms described here.
The focus here is the reliance theory. The specific concern
27
is with reliance as a nonbargain basis for promissory liability.'
128
manifestations.
As such a basis, reliance had two doctrinal
In one manifestation, reliance was seen as a ground for
promissory liability independent of any consideration doctrine.
In the 1901 edition of his contracts treatise, for example,
Northwestern University Professor Edward Harriman described

126.

See id.

127. For present purposes, I am not interested in arguments about the relative
importance of promise and reliance. That is, I am not interested in arguments about
whether the relevant paradigm is contract or tort. For overviews of the debate, see
generally GILMORE, supra note 102; Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond
Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15
HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 443-48 (1987); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 903, 903-06 (1985); Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional
Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 343-44, 364 (1969); Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New
Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under the Guise of Promissory Estoppel:
An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895, 897-908 (1987); Michael B.
Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and the Evolution of Contract
Law, 18 AM. BUS. L.J. 139, 184-93 (1980) [hereinafter Evolution]; Edward Yorio &
Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111, 111-15 (1991);
Phuong N. Pham, Note, The Waning of Promissory Estoppel, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
1263, 1263-70 (1994).
128. The history of such a theory of reliance is beyond the scope of this Article.
For intellectual histories, see generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 771-78 (1979); Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1373; Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel
and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678 (1984); Evolution, supra note 127, at
193-207; Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory
Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 500-08
(1983). For doctrinal histories, see generally Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel:
Principle From Precedents (pts. 1 & 2), 50 MICH. L. REV. 639, 873 (1952) [hereinafter Promissory Estoppel]; Malcolm P. Sharp, Promissory Liability (pt. 2), 7 U. CHI. L.
REV. 250, 251-56 (1939).
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the theory that a "promise becomes binding .. if the promisee
acts reasonably in reliance upon it."' Harriman specifically
contrasted this theory with a bargained-based "consideration
theory."'3 ° Harriman called this reliance theory the "estoppel
theory" on the ground "that this case differs from estoppel only
in one particular, viz., that 31here [the] act is a promise instead
of a representation of fact."'
Harriman's reference is the doctrine of estoppel by misrepresentation, sometimes referred to as equitable estoppel or
estoppel in pais. 132 Another turn-of-the-century treatise describes the predicates for this type of estoppel as follows:
1. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a representation or a concealment of
existing facts. 2. These facts must be known to the party
estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him. 3. The truth concerning these facts must
be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the
estoppel, at the time when such conduct was done, and at the
time when it was acted upon by him. 4. The conduct must be

done with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that
it will be acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will be
so acted upon.... 5. The conduct must be relied upon by the
other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon it.
6. He must in fact act upon it in such manner as to change
his position for the worse ...."

Traditionally, estoppel by misrepresentation was viewed as a
procedural device precluding a party from making certain (factual or legal) assertions relating to the misrepresentation.'"
The estoppel-based contract theory is not once, but at least
twice removed from this doctrine.
The first jump towards the estoppel-based theory involves
the move from a representation of present or past fact to a
promise of future conduct." The shift from fact represents a

129.
130.
131.
132.

EDWARD AVERY HARRIMAN, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
See idId. § 649.
See DAWSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 25.

§ 646

(2d ed. 1901).

133. 2 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 805 (3d ed.
1905); see also MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL 569-70
(5th ed. 1890) (listing the elements of estoppel by misrepresentation).
134. See 2 POMEROY, supra note 133, § 804 & n.2.
135. See Prescott v. Jones, 41 A. 352, 353 (N.H. 1898) (disallowing the use of

estoppel by misrepresentation when the representation that was relied on was related to the intention of a party); JOHN S. EWART, AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES
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move from the doctrine of estoppel by misrepresentation, but
not necessarily a move from estoppel generally. In his turn-ofthe-century treatise on estoppel, Melville Bigelow asserted that
estoppel by waiver and estoppel by misrepresentation are species of a larger genus-estoppel by conduct" 3 -- that treats
"conduct which it would be unrighteous and unjust to allow the
author of it to repudiate."" 7
Another step towards the estoppel-based theory involves the
move from procedure to substance. Under traditional doctrine,
the operation of the estoppel merely would be to preclude the
defendant from making certain assertions."' In the estoppelbased theory, however, reliance is a substantive basis for a
cause of action in the first instance.'39 Such a step was
foreshadowed by turn-of-the-century characterizations of
estoppel's procedural consequences in substantive terms.'4 °

OF ESTOPPEL BY MISREPRESENTATION 70 (1900) (noting that an assurance of future
action cannot be grounds for reliance).
In Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898), for example, plaintiff's
grandfather gave her a $2000 nonnegotiable promissory note and said, "I have fixed
[Nione of my grandchilout something that you have not got to work any more....
dren work, and you don't have to." Id. at 366. Plaintiff quit work, but her grandfather died without fully paying on or repudiating the note. See id. If the note had
recited a consideration, then one perhaps might have a representation of fact by the
grandfather. Cf Note, 12 HARV. L. REV. 506, 506 (1899) (explaining that "the maker
of the note never represented that there was any consideration for it"). In Ricketts,
however, it is the plaintiff who alleges that the consideration was her quitting her
job. See Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 366. The court held that reliance on the grandfather's
promise estopped his estate from "resist[ing] payment on the ground that the promise was given without consideration." Id. at 367.
See BIGELOW, supra note 133, at 556, 660 (grouping estoppel by misrep136.
resentation and estoppel by waiver together as types of estoppel growing out of
conduct).
137. Id. at 556. For a criticism of the existence of this genus, see EWART, supra
note 135, at 2-3 (critiquing Bigelow and proposing different divisions and subdivisions of the different types of estoppels).
In a situation like Ricketts, for example, one might say that a bargain is
138.
still required, but as a procedural matter the defendant is estopped from pleading
against plaintiff's allegation of consideration. In essence, the plaintiff's reliance is assumed to have been bargained for. See School Dist. v. Stocking, 40 S.W. 656, 658
(Mo. 1897) ("If the expense was incurred and the liability created in furtherance of
the enterprise the donor intended to promote, and in reliance upon the promises,
they will be taken to have been incurred at his instance and request, and his executors will be estopped to plead want of consideration.").
In Ricketts, for example, one might say that consideration is not a require139.
ment, and reliance provides a nonbargain basis for promissory liability. Ricketts,
however, appears to take the traditional view. See Ricketts, 77 N.W. at 367 (holding
that the defendant is estopped to resist payment on the ground that the promise
was given without consideration).
See 2 POMEROY, supra note 133, § 804 n.2; cf EWART, supra note 135, at
140.
187-95 (discussing estoppel as a cause of action and illustrating that it does so act).
Perhaps a third step from estoppel by misrepresentation to the estoppel-based
theory involves the removal of the (imputed) knowledge requirement. Ricketts, for
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In its other doctrinal incarnation, reliance represented an
expansion of the consideration doctrine. James Gordley has
observed that as early as 1857, Theophilus Parsons noted equity cases in which courts enforced promises to make a gift of
land if the promisee had taken possession and made improvements.' In Parsons' view, such results depended on the expanded notion of consideration used by equity courts."" In a
1913 Michigan Law Review article, University of Montana law
professor Henry Ballantine suggested a similar principle for
common law courts:
It is submitted that there should be recognized at the present
day, three distinct forms of consideration, or grounds why it is
unjust to break a promise and why a promise should be binding: (1) the usual one, the reciprocity of bargain or exchange;
(2) cases of quasi-estoppel or justifiable reliance on a gratuitous promise; and (3) an existing obligation, legal, equitable,
and also moral if based on value received, and coextensive
with the promise."
Interestingly, Ballantine cited Harriman as support for his approach.' The phrase "quasi-estoppel," however, may well be
taken from Bigelow's treatise on estoppel, which uses the term
to describe something arguably not part of estoppel doctrine,
but generally treated as closely related to it."'
Williston was long aware of the two approaches to reliance
described above. In his 1906 American edition of Sir Frederick
Pollock's contract treatise, Williston suggested that Pollock's
dismissal of the doctrine of "making representations good," the
English version of the estoppel-based theory,"' could not be
squared completely with. American decisions.4 7 Williston also
example, contains no suggestion of a requirement that the grandfather knew or
should have known that he would not keep the promise. See Ricketts, 77 N.W. at
365-67. Some commentators on estoppel, however, denied the existence of such a
general requirement at all. See EwART, supra note 135, at 83-97 (denying existence
of a knowledge requirement except for cases in which estoppel is sought against
party passively aiding misrepresentation by a third party).
141. See Gordley, supra note 120, at 563.
142. See THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 517-18 (3d ed. 1857)
(explaining that equity adopts the consideration requirement, but that it will find
consideration in reliance by the promisee).
143. Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Is the Doctrine of Consideration Senseless and
Illogical?, 11 MicH. L. REv. 423, 426 (1913).
144. See id. at 425 n.6.
145. See BIGELOW, supra note 133, at 673 & n.1 (describing the so-called election doctrine in a section of his treatise entitled Quasi-Estoppel).
146. See David Jackson, Estoppel as a Sword (pt. 1), 81 L.Q. REV. 84, 88-95
(1965) (describing the development and use of the English equivalent of the estoppelbased theory).
147. See Gordley, supra note 120, at 563-64. Pollock allowed that misrepresenta-
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knew of the expansion-of-consideration approach because he had
edited the 1893 edition of Parsons. 8 and because he had seen
Ballantine's 1913 article,' having cited it in a piece written
the very next year. 5 °
In the first edition of his contracts treatise, published in
1920,1" Williston discussed the two approaches to reliance described above. Unfortunately, he used the phrase "promissory
estoppel" for both. The expansion-of-consideration usage appears
in section 100, entitled "Differing modern tests of consideration," wherein he discussed the
several somewhat distinct and conflicting ideas as to what
constitutes a sufficient consideration.
1. The idea of promissory estoppel or tort. According to
this test, the reason for the enforcement of a promise would

be the justifiable reliance upon the promise, making it
wrongful for the promisor who has aroused expectation in the
promisee and induced him to act, to withdraw his promise.
2. The idea that the consideration is the price requested

and received by the promisor for the promise. This idea is
undoubtedly the fundamental and as to most cases the
generally accepted idea of consideration at the present time.
This usage of the word also accords with the usage in executed transactions when we speak of the consideration for a deed
or for a sale.
3. A past indebtedness or other situation which makes it
just that a promise should be enforced. This idea is in modem
times largely discredited except in certain special classes of
2
cases, which must now be regarded as exceptional."

In his 1913 article, Ballantine quoted Williston as asking,
"Why should not a promise be enforced, if the promisor might
reasonably suppose the promisee would act in reliance on the
promise, and if the promisee has in fact done so?"' 53 According

tions of fact prohibited their maker from stating otherwise later, but did not recog-

nize any estoppel based on promise since such would amount to contract, which

required consideration. See FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAv
AND IN EQUITY 649-50 (3d American ed. 1906) (containing annotations and additions
by Gustavus H. Wald & Samuel Williston). Williston and Wald noted several American decisions (including Ricketts) that did not coincide with Pollock's position. See id.
at 650 n.1.
148. See THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Samuel Williston ed.,
8th ed. 1893).
149. See Ballantine, supra note 143, at 423.
150. See Samuel Williston, Consideration in Bilateral Contracts, 27 HARV. L.
REV. 503, 504 n.2 (1914).
151.

152.
153.

SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920).
1 WILLISTON, supra note 151, § 100.

Ballantine, supra note 143, at 425.
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to Ballantine, Williston personally favored expanding the bargain-based doctrine of consideration to cover some notion of
unbargained-for reliance." Indeed, Corbin had similar beliefs
and offered a breakdown of consideration similar to that of

Ballantine and Williston in a 1926 article suggesting that a
new definition of consideration be made "inductively from the
collected decisions". 5 ' This is not quite consonant with
Gilmore's assertion that "Williston and Corbin held antithetical
points of view on almost every conceivable point of law.""
Yet there perhaps was one difference between Corbin and
Williston. Whereas Corbin apparently felt that the expansion-ofconsideration approach could be justified in terms of then-existing case law,'5 7 Williston did not. In section 139 of his treatise, Williston stated:
Doubtless there are reasons of justice for enforcing promises
which have led the promisee to incur any detriment on the
faith of them, not only when the promisor intended, but also
when he should reasonably have expected such detriment
would be incurred, though he did not request it as an exchange for his promise.... [Ilt may fairly be argued that the
fundamental basis of [informal] contracts historically was
action in justifiable reliance on a promise-rather than the
more modern notion of purchase of a promise for a price, and
that it is a consistent development from this early basis to define valid consideration as any legal benefit to the promisor or
legal detriment to the promisee given or suffered by the latter
in reasonable reliance on the promise. Such a definition eliminates the necessity of a request by the promisor for the consideration. The proposition is by no means without intrinsic
merit, but it should be recognized that if generally applied it
would much extend liability on promises, and that at present
it is opposed to the great weight of authority."4
Instead, Williston described the estoppel-based approach in
sections 116 and 139, noting that in certain limited cases some
4
courts employed "promissory estoppel" as a "substitute" for,'"

154.
peP).

See id. at 425 (concluding that Williston supported "a theory of quasi.estop-

155. Arthur L. Corbin, Non-Binding Promises as Consideration, 26 COLUM. L.
REV. 550, 556-57 & n.16 (1926).
156. GILMORE, supra note 102, at 60.
157. See Corbin, supra note 155, at 556-57 (explaining that a new definition of
consideration was warranted as modem decisions were dispensing with the old benefit and detriment notions and suggesting that reliance should be part of that definition).
158.

1 WILLISTON, supra note 151, § 139.

159.

See id. §§ 116, 139.
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or an "alternative" to, consideration.1" Williston used the
phrase "promissory estoppel" to suggest a relationship to estoppel by misrepresentation. 6 ' As indicated above, this approach
allows for justice-based limitations while retaining the cause-ofaction emphasis.'62
The Restatement's treatment of reliance is based on the
ideas sketched in Williston's treatise." Williston's earliest
drafts contain the forerunners of section 90." The title of the
group of sections containing section 90-"Informal Contracts
Without Assent or Consideration"' 65-makes it clear that this
is the estoppel-based, not the expansion-of-consideration, approach to reliance.'66 Indeed, a confidential ALI memorandum

See id. § 116.
160.
See id. § 139 (recognizing that the promisee is relying on "a promise and
161.
not on a misstatement of fact").
Williston apparently coined the phrase himself. See Benjamin F. Boyer, Prom.
issory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459,
459 & n.1 (1950); Carver, supra note 65, at 272 n.7; IOWA NOTE, supra note 65, at
333 n.5; Note, 20 VA. L. REV. 214, 216 & n.12 (1933) [hereinafter VIRGINIA NOTE].
Refer to note 133 supra and accompanying text (describing Bigelow's view
162.
that estoppel resolves unjust conduct).
Indeed, he cited his treatise as support for section 90. See AMERICAN LAW
163.
INSTITUTE, COMMENTARIES ON CONTRACTS-RESTATEMENT No. 2 6, 15-20 (1926)
[hereinafter COMMENTARIES].
See Gordley, supra note 120, at 566-67.
164.
Section 90 does not use estoppel language at all. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 90. The phrase "promissory estoppel" does appear later in the Restatement in a traditional procedural sense. A comment to one of the sections on the
Statute of Frauds notes that a party may be estopped from raising the Statute as a
defense if the other party has relied on a promise to provide an effective memorandum. See id. § 178 cmt. f. Farnsworth has hinted that the estoppel language may
have been eschewed to make it clear that the appropriate remedy is measured by
expectation rather than reliance. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises to Make Gifts,
43 AM. J. COmP. L. 359, 368 n.41 (1995). Christopher Brown hints that such language was avoided because of Corbin's feeling that the word "estoppel" was so overused as to be almost meaningless. See Christopher Brown, A Comparative and Criti.
cal Assessment of Estoppel in International Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 369, 379 n.43
(1996).
The remaining sections under this topic contain some of Ballantine's third
165.
class. Refer to note 116 supra and accompanying text (discussing informal contracts).
166. As a common-law lawyer, Williston attempted to place the reliance theory
on a sound footing by tying it to the older action of assumpsit. The explanatory
notes start by asserting that "[tihe action of Assumpsit was originally based on
reliance by the plaintiff on a promise rather than on a bargain." See COMMENTARIES,
supra note 163, at 14.
Williston's reference to assumpsit is interesting. Holmes tied the bargain theory to the older action of debt. See Holmes, supra note 109, at 199. Can the will
theory find support in the older actions? The most obvious candidate is the action of
covenant. The writ of covenant required a written and sealed document. See John H.
Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View From the Ryder
Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1183 (1996). A written, sealed document offers
powerful testimony that the maker of the instrument intended to be bound. Cf. Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.
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prepared by Williston for his Advisers makes the same point:
It has seemed to the draftsman better to deal with [cases not
requiring a bargain] frankly as exceptions, as is done in [the
group of sections], than to disarrange legal vocabulary by
drawing the inference from these exceptional cases that consideration means nothing more than "whatever makes a promise binding.""

As suggested in Williston's ALI memorandum, it is not at
all obvious that schizophrenia is present to the extent Gilmore
claimed.s Section 90 itself contains a justice-based limitation
reminiscent of Bigelow's description of the general ideas underlying estoppel by conduct.1" In addition, section 19 (entitled
"Requirements of the Law for Formation of Informal Contract"),
as well as one of the comments to section 75 (entitled "Definition of Consideration") make it plain that bargain is envisioned
as the primary basis for liability in the case of informal promis70

es.1

The story of section 90 does not end with its initial drafting. According to Williston:
[Section 90] was long considered by the Reporter and his
Advisers. It came before the Council and the Council was not
inclined to accept it, and a committee of the Council was appointed to consult with the Reporter and his Advisers with
this clause in mind as the chief one which was to be dealt
with, and of that committee of three, I should say at least two
and one-half were opposed to it. And after consideration and
examination of the authorities every suggestion that they had
made or had in mind seemed to them inadequate. The ffirst
thing that seemed possible was to take these different sets of
cases and say, simply grouping them together, that there were
exceptions to the rule and that a contract required consideration at the time. But I think the complete answer to that
and the one that satisfied the committee is [my]
statement ...

:

REV. 621, 641-42 (1919) (noting the medieval belief that human will created law and

enforcement of agreements supported by the existence of a document under seal).
167. Contracts Brief on Second Draft of Restatement at 3 (1924) (A.LJ. Archives).
168. See GILMOPE, supra note 102, at 60 (asserting that the Restatement of
Contracts has a "schizophrenic quality").
169. Refer to note 133 supra and accompanying text (describing estoppel by
conduct).
170. Section 19 states, "The requirements . . . for the formation of an informal
contract are: . . . [a] sufficient consideration except as otherwise stated in sections
85 to 94." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 19(c). Comment a to section 75
states, "[N]o duty is generally imposed on one who makes an informal promise unless the promise is supported by sufficient consideration (see § 19)." Id. § 75 cmt. a.
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"If the law is to be simplified and clarified, it can be done
only by coordinating the decisions under general rules, not by
stating empirically a succession of specific cases without any
binding thread of principle."
And it was because of the multitude of these cases, cases
which were law cases, that treating it as a matter of equity
was very soon given up. We had to adopt some general principle which would be stated as a section of this Restatement
which would cover the mass of authorities ...
The controversial nature of the reliance section is indicated
by another confidential memorandum submitted to the ALI
council by Adviser William Page, who objected to any general
inclusion of reliance as a basis of promissory liability and called
what would become section 90 "not advisable as new legislation; .. . [and] contrary to the great mass of authority." 72 Indeed, Daniel Klau has discovered a 1961 Corbin letter stating
that Corbin and Williston had to fight tenaciously to get section
90 through the drafters. 17 As previously mentioned, Corbin
preferred an expansion-of-consideration approach, 174 so that
his support during this time may have been less driven by the
specific Restatement framework than by the result. Nonetheless, he later indicated his approval of the Restatement framework as well. 175 Once again, this is not entirely consistent
with Gilmore's assertion that "Williston and Corbin held antithetical points of view on almost every conceivable point of
law.' 7 6
The controversy continued at the 1926 ALI annual meet77
The discussion covers almost thirty pages, 78 far more
ing.
than for any other section. Williston was a spirited defender of
section 90.17
4 A.L.I. PROC. app. at 108 (1926).
171.
William H. Page, Some Criticisms of Contracts, A.L.I. No. 10(a)-R, at 6
172.
(1925) (A.L.I. Archives).
See Klau, supra note 120, at 533-34.
173.
Refer to notes 147-55 supra and accompanying text (describing Williston's
174.
views on the expansion-of-consideration approach).
See Arthur L. Corbin, Recent Developments in Contracts, 50 HARV. L. REV.
175.
449, 455-56 (1937) (opining that "[oiriginally, the policy of the Institute in narrowing
But
the definition of consideration to a bargained for exchange seemed unsound ....
further thought leads to approval of the definition, when it is accompanied by the
definite assertion that many informal promises are enforceable without any consideration at all").
GILMORE, supra note 102, at 60.
176.
See Corbin, supra note 155, at 456 (noting that several members of the In177.
stitute made attacks upon section 90 at the meeting).
See 4 A.L.I. PROC. app. at 85-114 (1926).
178.
See id. at 85-114 (reporting Williston's defense against the attacks upon the
179.
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Given this background, it is not surprising that section 90
became one of the most prominent Restatement sections. For
example, a 1929 British article finds it to be "extremely interesting to an English lawyer."" In 1933, the dean of the Yale
Law School could state that it "has already become somewhat
famous." 8 ' A 1935 Canadian journal describes it as
"[p]robably the most notorious section in the Contract Restatement." "e By 1940, the section was "famous.""

Not only was Cardozo present during the 1926 discussion," but two New York Court of Appeals decisions were cited in the debate, although each for radically different purposes.
Ira Hildebrand invoked one of Cardozo's statements in De Cicco
v. Schweizer"S in support of Hildebrand's arguments against
section 90."'s Williston offered Siegel v. Spear & Cos' in

section throughout the entire discussion).
180. P.-L Winfield, The American Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 11 J.
COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 179, 185 (1929).
181. Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J.
643, 656 (1933).
182. Cecil A. Wright, The American Law Institute's Restatement of Contracts and
Agency, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 17, 38 (1935).
183. George Jarvis Thompson, Some Current Economic and Political Impacts in
the Law of Contract, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 4, 9 (1940).
184. See 4 A.L.I. PROC. app. at 82 (1926) (indicating that Cardozo, as Vice President, presided over the meeting).
185. 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917). In De Cicco, a mother and father promised to
pay their engaged daughter an annuity upon marriage. See id. at 808. The marriage
took place and the promised payments continued for about ten years, at which point
they stopped. See id. The couple subsequently sued for breach of contract. See id.
According to Cardozo, if the purported bargain involved the parents and only the
daughter, then the daughter's act of going through with the marriage would not be
sufficient consideration because that act already was required under the engagement
contract. See id. The same reasoning would apply if the bargain involved the parents
and only the son-in-law, but the pre-existing duty rule would not apply if the bargain was between the parents and the couple jointlyThe courts of this state are committed to the view that a promise by
A. to B. to induce him not to break his contract with C. is void. If that is
the true nature of this promise, there was no consideration. We have never
held, however, that a like infirmity attaches to a promise by A., not merely
to B., but to B. and C. jointly, to induce them not to rescind or modify a
contract which they are free to abandon. To determine whether that is in
substance the promise before us, there is need of closer analysis.
Id. at 808-09 (citations omitted). "Closer analysis" revealed that it was. See id. at
809.
186. See 4 A.L.i PROC. app. at 104-05 (1926) (asserting that the ALI "should
[not] reject what Judge Cardozo says is law in De Cicco v. Schweizer). In a discussion of the distinction between a gift promise and a promise that is part of a bargain, Cardozo stated, "Nothing is consideration that is not regarded as such by both
parties." De Cicco, 117 N.E. at 810 (quoting Philpot v. Gruninger, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
570, 577 (1871)).
187. 138 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1923). In Siegel, a promise was made by a gratuitous
bailee to take out insurance on the bailed property. See id. at 415. According to the
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favor of section 90 in response."
Cardozo did not speak up during the debate.189 I suggest
that he weighed in on the issue from the bench. At that time,
opinions in the New York Court of Appeals were assigned by
rotation,"9 so Cardozo would have had to make the most of
The next year offered him Allegheny Colany 19opportunity.
1
lege.

C. Allegheny College: The Opinion
[Allegheny College] is generally and rightly considered too
clever by half, yet Cardozo was plainly on to something ....
-Richard

Posner192

New York Court of Appeals:
[D]efendant undertook to store the plaintiff's property without any
compensation ...
[The promise [to insure] . . . was linked up with the gratuitous bail. ..
ment...
[The property] was still in the plaintiff's possession [until the promise
to insure was made]. It was after his statements and promises that the
plaintiff sent [his property] to the storehouse. The defendant . . . entered
upon the execution of a trust. . . . As Chancellor Kent said in referring to
the earlier cases: ". . . an action upon the case lay for a misfeasance, in the
breach of a trust undertaken voluntarily."
From this aspect of the case we think there was a consideration for
the agreement to insure.
Id. at 415-16. Cardozo was part of the majority, but he did not write the opinion. See
id. at 416.
According to one commentator:
The [Siegel] court seems to rest its decision upon two grounds-first, that
defendant had entered upon the execution of the trust and, second, that
there was consideration for [defendant's] promise. The second of these reasons attempts to place the transaction in a bargain context. It considers
that the surrender of the [property] . . . could be made the basis for a bargain.
Promissory Estoppel, supra note 128, at 666-67.
188. According to Williston, "[T]here was no consideration for the promise [in
Siegel] . . . . [T]he court enforced the promise and held the promisor was liable
because the owner of the goods naturally assumed that the insurance would be taken out." 4 A.L.I. PROC. app at 107 (1926). Williston cited Siegel in the Commentaries
to a draft of the Restatement. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 163, at 18.
See 4 A.L.I. PROC. app. at 85-114 (1926) (showing the absence of participa189.
tion by Cardozo during the discussion).
See Frank H. Hiscock, The Court of Appeals of New York: Some Features of
190.
Its Organization and Work, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 131, 138 (1929); Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Mr. Justice Cardozo, HARPERS MAGAZINE, June 1932, at 34, 38.
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173
191.
(N.Y. 1927).
Posner, supra note 3, at 14.
192.
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Allegheny College involves a pledge card signed by Mary
Yates Johnston and delivered to the college in response to a
fund raising campaign:
Estate Pledge, Allegheny College
Second Century Endowment.
Jamestown, N.Y., June 15, 1921
In consideration of my interest in Christian education,
and in consideration of others subscribing, I hereby subscribe
and will pay to the order of the treasurer of Allegheny College, Meadville, Pennsylvania, the sum of five thousand dollars; $5,000.
This obligation shall become due thirty days after my
death, and I hereby instruct my executor, or administrator, to
pay the same out of my estate. This pledge shall bear interest
at the rate of - per cent. per annum, payable annually,
from - till paid. The proceeds of this obligation shall be
added to the Endowment of said Institution, or expended in
accordance with instructions on reverse side of this pledge.
Name: Mary Yates Johnston
Address: 306 East 6th Street, Jamestown, N.Y.
Dayton E. McClain, Witness
T.R. Courtis, Witness, 93
To authentic signature.
Johnston added the following to the back of the card:
In loving memory this gift shall be known as the Mary
Yates Johnston memorial fund, the proceeds from which shall
be used to educate students in preparing for the ministry,
either in the United States or in the Foreign Field.
This pledge shall be valid only on the condition that the
provisions of my will, now extant, shall be first met.... Mary
Yates Johnston."
In December 1923,
The pledge was never fulfilled."
Johnson had paid a sum of $1000." s However, Johnston repudiated the balance of the pledge in July 1924.'9 Thirty days
after her death, the college sued the bank (Johnston's executor)
to recover the difference between the pledge amount and the
$1000 payment. 9 ' The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, finding that Johnston's promise lacked consideration.'"
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 174.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

198.

See id.

199.

See Opinion of the Court at 24 (unpublished opinion, available in Record of
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The intermediate appellate court affirmed unanimously without
explanation."'
At the time of these events, American courts were predisposed to find liability in charitable subscription cases. Indeed,
in the same year that the New York Court of Appeals was
considering Allegheny College, one commentator could state with
confidence that "the hundreds of American charitable subscription cases attest the fact that our courts intend to enforce these
promises."'
There was less agreement, however, about which doctrinal
theory should apply, with courts using a bewildering variety of
reliance or bargain approaches.0 2 Courts sometimes found the
charitable subscription to be an offer of a unilateral contract.0 3 As soon as the charity performed any act towards carrying out the project for which the subscription was given, a
contract was formed. In other cases, courts found the subscription to be an offer for a bilateral contract.2 4 This required
finding a counter promise. One might, for example, imply such
a promise from the very same acts used in the first
approach.2 5 In still other cases, courts found that various subscribers to a project made a multilateral contract among themselves and that their mutual promises to the charity were consideration for each other.0 ' Finally, some courts adopted a reliance approach.2 7 Despite the lower courts' cursory treatment
of Johnston's pledge, New York courts had often adhered to the
2 8
prevailing treatment of charitable subscriptions.

Allegheny College).
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 221 N.Y.S. 784
200.
(App. Div.), rev'd, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
T.C. Billig, The Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions, 12
201.
CORNELL L.Q. 467, 479 (1927); cf. Annotation, Consideration for Subscription Agreements, 38 A.L.R. 868, 869 (1925) [hereinafter Subscription Agreements] (observing
"the tendency now is to uphold subscription as valid and enforceable, whenever that
can be done without overstepping entirely established rules requiring consideration
to uphold executory contracts").
See Billig, supra note 201, at 469-79; Recent Decision, 18 CAL. L. REV. 314,
202.
314-17 (1930).
See Billig, supra note 201, at 469-73; Recent Decision, supra note 202, at
203.
315.
See Billig, supra note 201, at 476; Recent Decision, supra note 202, at 315204.
16.
See Billig, supra note 201, at 476.
205.
See Billig, supra note 201, at 474-75; Recent Decision, supra note 202, at
206.
315.
See Billig, supra note 201, at 476-79; Recent Decision, supra note 202, at
207.
316.
See Billig, supra note 201, at 470-72 (commenting that the prevailing New
208.
York rule was to follow the unilateral contract approach in regarding the act of the
promisee as accepting the offer of the promisor if an implied request for the act
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Moreover, the facts of Allegheny College would only seem to
reinforce such a disposition. The plaintiff was a small liberal
arts college over a century old,2' 9 and the defendant was a

bank.21° In addition, the record reveals nothing about why

Johnston revoked her pledge.2 1' Indeed, plaintiff's brief begins
its recitation of the facts with the observation that "plaintiff is
a small college ... and has for many years offered instruction
to students in the higher education, and is one of the small
colleges whose high ideals have made a substantial contribution
to society."2" Johnston was merely "defendant's testatrix, a
resident of the City of Jamestown, New York, with an interest
in philanthropic and educational activities."' After describing
the capital campaign in some detail, the brief notes Johnston's
execution of the pledge card, the payment of $1000, her death,
and her Executor's refusal to pay."' The brief goes on to note
the importance of such pledges for charitable institutions," 5
and that courts were generally receptive to enforcement." '

As a doctrinal matter, the briefs focus on the question of
whether there was a bargain. In the main, plaintiff's brief advances a unilateral contract approach and offers two

could be found); Orvill C. Snyder, Promissory Estoppel in New York, 15 BROOK. L
REV. 27, 34-36 (1949) (chronicling the favorable treatment by New York courts in
charitable subscription cases and noting the most common approach was the unilateral contract, although also noting several cases where the subscription was upheld
as a bilateral contract); cf Jacob Lewis Gold, Note, 8 CORNELL L.Q. 57, 57 (1923)
(arguing that although New York courts frequently found consideration based on an
implied request for performance by the promisor, such an implication was not always warranted).
For assertions that New York courts were more restrictive, see MiNOTA
NOTE, supra note 65, at 644 & n.7 (concluding that with Allegheny College "the
attitude of the New York court toward subscription agreements has undergone a
decided change"); YALE NOTE, supra note 65, at 823 (stating that "[tihe New York
courts have not been friendly to charitable subscriptions and have upheld them in
only a limited number of situations").
209. Allegheny College was founded in 1815. WORLD ALIANAC AND BOOK OF
FACTS 1996, at 224 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1995).
210. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173
(N.Y. 1927).
211. See Konefsky, supra note 51, at 657 n.31. In fact, research suggests that
Johnston was fearful that her estate could not support both her charitable bequests
and certain impoverished relatives, and that the $1000 payment was an attempt to
strike a middle ground. See id. at 657 (describing research by Richard Danzig). Indeed, defendant's answer to plaintiff's original complaint describes the $1000 as
consideration for a release from any claim based on the pledge card. Defendant's Answer at 13, Allegheny College.
212. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, Allegheny College.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 3-5.
215. See id. at 14.
216. See id. at 16-18.
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considerations for Johnston's pledge: the college's procurement
of other pledges as requested in the pledge card,217 and the
establishment of the Mary Yates Johnston memorial fund upon
receipt of the $1000 payment.218 According to defendant's
brief, however, Johnston had not requested the procurement of
other pledges,219 and the College had held the money without
actually setting up the fund.2 In plaintiff's reply brief, there
are hints of the bilateral approach eventually adopted by
Cardozo: "[A] liability was assumed in the administration of the
trust fund, when, with the first $1000 paid, that fund became
operative. That resulted in the assumption of responsibility, of
liability, and obligated Allegheny College to fulfill the responsibilities required by the subscription paper."221
The briefs contain some minor secondary skirmishes involving reliance. During its discussion of the general receptiveness
to the enforcement of charitable subscriptions, plaintiff's brief
presents the word "estoppel" 2 and, with respect to the expansion-of-consideration approach, hints that "there has been less
regard to mere technicalities of either substance or procedure."2" Nonetheless, the brief states, "[b]ut we do not have
to go so far to sustain plaintiff's contentions at bar. We have
referred to these matters rather to point out the attitude which
modern thought has been taking toward the enforcement of
[charitable subscriptions]."224 Moreover, the brief takes great
pains to distinguish cases in which promisors had sought nothing in exchange for their promises.22 Defendant's brief argues
that estoppel would not apply on the facts of the case,226 and
it decries any expansion of the consideration doctrine.2
Cardozo uses the variety of doctrinal approaches in such
cases as the starting point for the heart of his opinion: "The
See id. at 19-29.
217.
218. See id. at 29-36.
219.
See Respondent's Brief at 11, Allegheny College.
See id. at 14. Thus unfulfilled, the offer to enter into this unilateral con220.
tract would have expired with Johnston's death. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 35(f). Other issues argued in the briefs are beyond the scope of this Article.
221.
Appellant's Reply Brief at 7-8, Allegheny College.
Appellant's Brief at 17, Allegheny College.
222.
Id. at 17-18.
223.
Id. at 18.
224.
See id. at 27. At one point, plaintiff's brief seems to suggest that actions
225.
taken to expand the college's facilities would be consideration under an expansion-ofconsideration approach. See id. at 21. However, these actions subsequently are characterized as requested by Johnston as part of the maintenance of the scholarship
fund. See id. at 30-34; Appellant's Reply Brief at 8, Allegheny College.
See Respondent's Brief at 23, Allegheny College.
226.
See id. at 16-22.
227.
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law of charitable subscriptions has been a prolific source of
controversy in this state and elsewhere."'
Cardozo immediately links the charitable subscription cases
to a general discussion of promissory liability: "We have held
that a promise of that order is unenforceable like any other if
made without consideration."' As in the Restatement, consideration means bargain. Indeed, Cardozo points out that it is
"little more than a half truth" to accept as consideration
unbargained-for detriment on the part of the promisee."
Nonetheless, "'t]hehalf truths of one generation tend at times
to perpetuate themselves in the law as the whole truth of another, when constant repetition brings it about that qualifications, taken once for granted, are disregarded or forgotten."m '
Cardozo observes that "there has grown up of recent days ...
Cardozo cites the
what is styled 'a promissory estoppel."' '
two sections in Williston's treatise describing the Restatement
Nonetheless, as Williston did in his treatise,'
approach.'
Cardozo uses the phrase "promissory estoppel" to refer to the
expansion-of-consideration approach as well.'
Cardozo goes on to say that the bargain theory is the "clasand that
sic doctrine" 6 with all its "ancient rigor,"'

228. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 174
(N.Y. 1927) (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 174 (emphasis added). By that time, New York had largely eliminated the effect of the seal. See William J. Lloyd, Consideration and the Seal in
New York-An Unsatisfactory Legislative Program, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1946)
(describing New York's legislative decision to make sealed instruments only presumptive evidence of sufficient consideration).
230. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 174.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 175 (quoting 1 WILLISTON, supra note 151, §§ 116, 139).
233. See id.
234. Refer to notes 151-52 supra and accompanying text (noting the inclusion of
the expansion-of-consideration approach into his treatise).
235. Refer to notes 249-50 infra and accompanying text (showing Cardozo's use
of the phrase "promissory estoppel" in this way). According to some commentators,
Cardozo sticks entirely with the Restatement approach. See, eg., Bernard Rothbaum,
Jr., Note, Estoppel: Status of Promissory Estoppel in Oklahoma, 22 OKLA. L. REV.
89, 91-92 (1969) (opining that Cardozo views the concept of promissory estoppel in
section 90 as "a separate and independent doctrine that may be applied in place of
consideration"). According to others, Cardozo uses the expansion-of-consideration
approach. See, e.g., Alvin C. Harrell, The Bank-Customer Relationship: Evolution of a
Modern Form?, 11 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 641, 670 n.130 (1986) (commenting that in
Allegheny College, Cardozo "specifically adopted promissory estoppel as a form of
consideration'); Konefsky, supra note 51, at 686-87 (asserting that Cardozo positions
promissory estoppel, "if only in dictum, not as an exception to consideration doctrine,
but squarely within it").
236. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 174.
237. Id. at 175.
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reliance theories are the result of an "effacement."238 Yet what
Cardozo does in the remainder of the opinion is support the
Restatement's basic position that reliance can provide a nonbargain basis for promissory liability by juxtaposing bargain and
reliance theories to produce an effect reminiscent of that resulting from Mark Antony's funeral oration for Julius Caesar. 39
In the famous scene from Shakespeare's play, Brutus, one
of the murderers of Caesar, and then Antony, one of Caesar's
supporters, address the Roman people.24 What is of interest
here is the part of Antony's speech that Gayle Greene has described as follows:
All Antony does in the opening... of his remarkable oration ...

is to pretend to accept Brutus's claim, Caesar "was

ambitious," and then set about undermining it, by twisting a
few crucial words. Merely by repeating, at regular and strategic intervals within a subtly changing context, "Brutus says he
was ambitious and Brutus is an honorable man," he causes
the words "honor" and "ambition" to assume opposite and
ironic meanings, . . . . Thus twenty-one lines into the speech,
"Brutus says he was ambitious, / And Brutus is an honorable
man" actually means, "Caesar was not ambitious, nor is
Brutus honorable," and by line 155, the crowd itself can draw
the conclusion which Antony nowhere has to state: "They were
traitors; honorable men!" Master of irony, Antony is a master
of language who has power to make words mean what he
wills."'
Cardozo, as does Antony, adopts a certain ironic and ultimately corrosive deference towards a position that he wishes to
attack. This type of architectural rhetoric introduces students to
an aspect of law as an art that goes beyond elementary translations into the legal media of intuitive bases of promissory liability. Here, such translations are set in an overall pattern so as
to evoke a certain type of response in the reader. At this point,
a legal Antony might say that the Holmesian bargain-based
theory is the honorable theory.
Cardozo goes on to discuss the contract law of New
York.242 He says that there may be "signposts on the road" to

238.

Id. at 174.

239.
240.

JULIUS CAESAR, supra note 13, act 3, sc. 2.
See id.

241.

Gayle Greene, "The Power of Speech / To Stir Men's Blood": The Language

of Tragedy in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, in 11 RENAISSANCE DRAMA 67, 85-86

(Douglas Cole ed., 1980) (citations omitted).
242. See Allegheny College, 159 N.E at 174.
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reliance.2" Interestingly, these signposts are De Cicco and
Siegel.2 " Is this merely a coincidence? Or do we find here
Cardozo's comment on the Hildebrand-Williston clash? 4 In
any case, Cardozo asserts: "[iW]e do not now attempt to say"
whether this effacement has modified the "general law of consideration."2'
Nonetheless, New York courts have "at
least ... adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel" in certain charitable subscription cases."" Earlier in the opinion
Cardozo had described these cases by saying that "we have
found consideration present where the general law of contract,

at least as then declared, would have said that it was absent.'
Here he says: "[Consideration there was none except
upon the theory of a promissory estoppel."" This is the

243. Id. at 175.
244. See id.
245. Given the description of De Cicco, the reader may wonder how the case
could be a signpost. For such readings of De Cicco, see Arthur L. Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 48 YALE L.J. 426, 431-37 (1939) [hereinafter
Corbin, Cardozo] (analyzing the De Cicco opinion and commenting that the decision
was influential in laying the foundation for the adoption of the reliance theory in
section 90); Davis, supra note 120, at 807 (asserting that Cardozo's decision in Do
Cicco had an impact on "developing the doctrine of promissory estoppel and with it
a less formal conception of contract law").
What about Siegel? According to some contemporaneous commentators, only a
reliance theory could explain the result. See Arthur L. Corbin, Comment, Consideration for Promises by a Gratuitous Bailee, 32 YALE L.J. 609, 611 (1923) (concluding
that the decision in Siegel must rest upon the principle that some reliance makes
promises binding without any other consideration); Recent Important Decision, Liability of Gratuitous Bailee for Breach of Promise to Procure Insurance, 22 MICH. L.
REv. 64, 65-66 (1924) (noting that Siegel "can only be justified on the theory that a
detrimental reliance on a promise is sufficient consideration for it"); Note, The Extent
of a Gratuitous Bailee's Liability in Contract, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 576 (1923)
(concluding "that the only possible support for the decision [in Siegel] lies in remolding our accepted notions of consideration so as to include reliance, in the form of
action or forbearance on a promise, as sufficient, though there is no bargain").
For an argument that these cases cannot be viewed as signposts, see Snyder,
supra note 208, at 37-39 (arguing that in both Siegel and Do Cicco bargain, not
reliance, was the basis for the decisions).
246. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 175.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 174.
249. Id. at 175. As a matter of precedent, Cardozo's treatment of these earlier
cases is arguable. The dissent asserts that these cases found a bargain and that
they did not rest on any expanded notion of consideration. See id. at 177 (Kellogg,
J., dissenting) (arguing that decisions in prior New York charitable subscription
cases were based on unilateral contract and not promissory estoppel); see also
Snyder, supra note 208, at 37-39 (controverting Cardozo's assertion that previous
charitable subscription cases were lacking a bargain).
Cardozo was well aware of the importance of such hermeneutics, and his
treatment of precedents offers another opportunity to consider the artistic aspects of
the opinion. See Weisberg, supra note 49, at 315-17 (illustrating Cardozo's familiarity
and skill with the methodological principles of interpretation).

1142

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1103

expansion-of-consideration approach, and it would be incompatible with the honorable theory of bargain. Yet Cardozo says:
Decisions . . ., which are supported by so many considerations
of public policy and reason, will not be overruled to save the
symmetry of a concept which itself came into our law, not so
much from any reasoned conviction of its justice, as from
historical accidents of practice and procedure.5 0
Is then the honorable theory not quite so honorable?2 5'
Cardozo quickly steps back from his implicit critique: "The
concept survives as one of the distinctive features of our legal
system. We have no thought to suggest that it is obsolete or on
the way to be abandoned."25 2 Yes, the bargain theory is, after
all, the honorable theory. Moreover, the expansion-of-consideration approach leads to the "pressure of exceptions" resulting in
"irregularities of form." 5'
Cardozo next presents his plan for dealing with this particular charitable subscription case: "[W]e may find in the end
that without recourse to the innovation of promissory estoppel
the transaction can be fitted within the mould of consideration
as established by tradition.""u Now reliance is an innovation?
Cardozo sticks with the bargain theory, developing a bilateral
contract approach over the next two lengthy paragraphs. 55
Cardozo ultimately grounds promissory liability on a bilateral
bargain formed when the college accepted the $1000 payment,
thereby impliedly promising to maintain a scholarship fund in
Johnston's name as per her wishes on the back of the pledge
card. 5

250.

Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 175. This example of Cardozo's rhetorical

style introduces another aspect of law as an art-his rhetorical patterns are ornamented with particular flourishes.
251.
Who is Cardozo insulting here? Holmes, who extolled reasonableness of
[the] bargained for consideration requirement. So much for venerating Holmes and
consideration. EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, REVISED TEACHING NoTEs
To ACCOMPANY STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 78 (Ian Ayres rev. ed. 1995).
252. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 175.
253. Id. It is tempting to see Cardozo here going further than merely supporting
the basic Restatement position that reliance can provide a nonbargain basis for
promissory liability. At this point, he may be supporting the specific Restatement
approach in questioning both the bargain theory and the expansion-of-consideration
approach to reliance by playing them off one another.
254. Id.
255.
See id. at 175-77.
256.
See id. at 176. This appears to be the answer to the defendant's contention
that the fund had not been set up. Note that Cardozo's specific reasoning involves
two leaps of implication: Johnston's pledge card is brought forward and conjoined
with the $1000 tender to form the requisite offer, and the College's actions are construed as containing the requisite acceptance.
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In a final short paragraph, Cardozo notes that "[tihe conclusion thus reached makes it needless to consider whether...
a promissory estoppel may result .... .' Hadn't he already
demonstrated why it was needless? The bargain theory is, after
all, the honorable theory, is it not? Cardozo offers what is intended to appear to be a quick and simple reliance argument
based on the steps that the college had taken "to apply the
fund, so far as already paid, to special purposes not mandatory
under the provisions of the college charter (the support and
such
education of students preparing for the ministry);'
steps being "induced by the belief that other payments sufficient in amount to ,make the scholarship effective would be
to the fund thereafter upon the death of the subscribadded
2 9
er."
Throughout the opinion, Cardozo apparently extols the
It has "ancient
bargain theory. It is the "classic doctrine.'
rigor." ' It is "one of the distinctive features of our legal system.'
It is "established by tradition.' - Cardozo has "no
thought to suggest that it is obsolete or on the way to be abanReliance theories are the result of an "effacedoned."
ment"' and the expansion-of-consideration form results in "irregularities."2 Cardozo does find a bargain with not much
more of a stretch than many other charitable subscription
cases. Still, doesn't finding a bargain take much more work
than the reliance approach?
As the questions interspersed in the preceding discussion
indicate, there is at best an ironic deference here. According to
one contemporaneous commentator:
The court then pretends to decide the case without applying
[reliance] ... , but the difficulty it experiences in doing so
serves only to strengthen the feeling that most, if not all,
cases enforcing charitable subscriptions can be sustained logically on no theory other than that of promissory estoppel.'
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
REV. 1,

Id. at 177.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 175.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 174-75.
Id. at 175.
William K Laidlaw, Consideration and Promissory Estoppe, 5 LINCOLN L
3-4 (1932).
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It is thus no wonder that the Reporter and his supporters
seized on Allegheny College. In his section 90 explanatory notes
for the 1928 official draft, Williston cited the case for support,

As an aside, there is a second similarity between Allegheny College and the
Shakespeare funeral scene. Antony's speech is more than ironic. It is also emotional
and dramatic, and it clashes with the logical approach taken by Brutus in his
speech preceding Antony's. See DAVID DAICHES, SHAKESPEARE: JULIUS CAESAR 35-41

(1976) (comparing the style of Antony's speech and the resulting riotous effect on the
crowd with Brutus' logical and abstract style of speech).
Something of a similar comparison can be made with Kellogg's dissent, joined
by Andrews. Kellogg begins with an attack on Cardozo's bargain approach. He does
not see any offer himself, but asserts that at most there is an offer to enter into a
unilateral contract, the requested act being that "the 'gift' should be known as the
Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund." Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 177. In a logical tour de force, Kellogg argues the following:
[T]he requested acts, under the very terms of the assumed offer, could never
have been performed at a time to convert the offer into a promise. This is
so for the reason that the donation was not to take effect until after the
death of the donor, and by her death her offer was withdrawn.
Id.
Kellogg goes on to dispute that any thing other than the bargain theory was
operating in the charitable subscription cases cited by Cardozo. See id.
About the only spirited part of Kellogg's dissent is his discussion of reliance:
However, even if the basis of the decisions be a so-called "promissory estoppel," nevertheless they initiated no new doctrine. A so-called "promissory
estoppel," although not so termed, was held sufficient by Lord Mansfield and
his fellow judges as far back as the year 1765. (Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3
Burr. 1663.) Such a doctrine may be an anomaly; it is not a novelty. Therefore I can see no ground for the suggestion that the ancient rule which
makes consideration necessary to the formation of every contract is in danger of effacement through any decisions of this court. To me that is a cause
for gratulation rather than regret.
Id. at 177-78. Nonetheless:
[Tihe discussion may be beside the mark, for I do not understand that the
holding about to be made in this case is other than a holding that consideration was given to convert the offer into a promise. With that result I cannot agree and, accordingly, must dissent.
Id. at 178. One need only compare Kellogg's tone with one of Cardozo's particular
turns of phrase.
Kellogg's use of Pillans is interesting. The parties were merchants and the case
involved a written promise to accept a bill of exchange. See Pillans & Rose v. Van
Mierop & Hopkins, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1035 (K.B. 1765). After an initial hearing
before Justices Mansfield and Wilmot, the case was heard by the full King's Bench.
See id. at 1036-37. At the full hearing, Mansfield asserted that in "commercial cases"
the common law did not require consideration for a written promise. See id. at 1038.
That position was repudiated by the House of Lords in Rann v. Hughes, 101 Eng.
Rep. 1014 n.a (1778) (holding that the need for consideration is not obviated merely
because a promise is written). In Pillans, Justice Yates perhaps hinted at an expansion of consideration that would include unbargained-for reliance. See KESSLER ET AL.,
supra note 122, at 750-51 (suggesting that Justice Yates' opinion "contains the seeds"
for expanding the consideration doctrine to include actual reliance as well as risk of
reliance). At the initial hearing, Wilmot might be seen as adopting the Restatement
approach to reliance. See Daniel W. Fessler, TEACHING NOTES FOR FESSLER AND
LOISEAUX'S CONTRAc's MORALITY, ECONOMICS, AND THE MARKETPLACE CASES AND
MATERIALS 34, 54 (1982).
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going so far as to describe the decision as "strildng." In
1939, Corbin could state that Allegheny College played a fundamental role in the acceptance of section 90 by the ALI. Indeed, Richard Danzig and Judge John Noonan have suggested a
symbiotic relation between Allegheny College and the Restatement of Contracts.27 In the 1936 edition of his treatise,
Williston cited Allegheny College in support of the principle underlying section 90."' By 1948, the Cardozo of Allegheny

College was being called a "eulogist" for section 90.'
Having said all this, one is left with the question of why
Cardozo did not employ a more direct approach. Although it
might be tempting to suppose that the Allegheny College opinion simply represents Cardozo reveling in his art, the answer
may lie in more mundane concerns. Perhaps his problem was
that his majority would go no further.' According to Charles
Fried, Allegheny College is an example in which "a court...
268. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 explanatory notes (1928).
269. See Corbin, Cardozo, supra note 245, at 435 (citing Allegheny College as
part of the judicial basis for section 90).
270. See NOONAN, supra note 87, at 196-97 (crediting Richard Danzig with
pointing out the relationship between Allegheny College and the Restatement of Contracts); cf. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLAM F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS 103 (5th ed.
1993) (asserting influence of the Restatement of Contracts on Allegheny College).
It is worth noting that William Presser and Young Smith have suggested a
symbiotic relation between section 281 of the First Restatement of Torts and
Cardozo's opinion in Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). See
WniLIAM L. PROSSER & YOUNG B. SMIm, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ToRTS 365-66

(3d ed. 1962) (indicating that section 281 and Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf had
"elevated one another by their own bootstraps"). According to Presser, the torts Reporter had called a meeting of the Advisers (including Cardozo) to discuss the draft
of a section dealing with the so-called unforeseeable plaintiff. See William L Prosser,
PaisgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1953). The position put forth by the
Reporter, which was sustained at the meeting by a slim margin, later appeared as
the law of the case in Cardozo's opinion, which opinion in turn was cited by the
Reporter when the section was presented at the ALIs annual meeting. See id. at 5,
8. Prosser further asserts that in notes distributed at the meeting, the Reporter had
even attached a statement of the facts of Palsgraffrom the lower court. See id. at 4
(stating that the Reporter for the Restatement of the Law of Torts thought "Palsgraf
provided a perfect illustration" of the issue). Cardozo thus found himself unexpectedly confronted with a discussion of a case that might very well appear before his
court. As a result, he did not take part in the discussion and did not vote. See id.
(emphasizing that Cardozo found no impropriety in his role of spectator at the meeting). In his forthcoming biography, Kaufman sets forth the reasons why he thinks
that the case was never discussed at this meeting. Interviews with Kaufman, supra
note 8.
271.

See I SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOM-PSON, A TREATISE ON THE

LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 139 n.5, 140 n.3 (rev. ed. 1936).
272. See Snyder, supra note 208, at 27.
273.

See RANDY E. BARNErt, TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR CONTRACTS: CASES AND

PERSPECTIVES 390 (1995). Interestingly, direct statements in favor of the
Restatement's doctrinal position on reliance might have garnered Cardozo the support of at least one of the dissenters. See id.
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concludes that the time has come to modify or overrule precedent but shrinks from doing so candidly, it shrinks from encountering the discipline of explicit justification."2 74 M.B.W.
Sinclair saw the same problem, but in terms slightly different
than Fried. In discussing the difficulty of selling "an innovative
opinion to a bunch of old men," Sinclair cites Allegheny College
as an example of Cardozo's "famous . . .ability to disguise the
import in the reasoning, a technique which must have facilitated the acquiescence of his fellow justices.""5 In this regard, it
is interesting to note that one current casebook tells us that "as
of this writing ... the New York Court of Appeals has flirted
with [section 90] but never definitely adopted it." '76
D. Other Views of Allegheny College
During his twenty years [on the New York Court of Appeals]
Cardozo succeeded to an extraordinary degree in freeing
up-and, of course, unsettling-the law of New York. It is
true that he went about doing this in such an elliptical, convoluted, at times incomprehensible, fashion that the less gifted
lower court New York judges were frequently at a loss to understand what they were being told.
-Grant

Gilmore..

From the beginning, commentators have been fascinated by
the extensive nature of Cardozo's discussion of the reliance
theory.7 ' None of these commentators, however, has appreciated fully the subtlety of Cardozo's approach. Some commentators have found little, if any, complexity. Other commentators,
although more discerning in their examination, have ignored

274.
Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention,
100 HARv. L. REV. 751, 752 (1987).
275.
M.B.W. Sinclair, Evolution in Law: Second Thoughts, 71 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 31, 47 (1993).
276.
THOIAs D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS: TEACHER'S MANUAL 42 (2d ed. 1993). But see CHARLES L.
KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
199 (3d ed. 1993) (citing lower New York court opinions and asserting that "it now
appears that promissory estoppel is firmly established in the law of New York, although the number of cases in which the doctrine has been successfully asserted is
relatively small").
277.
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 75 (1977).
278.
One commentator has suggested that Cardozo was influenced by the Kantian principles of trust and respect. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract:
The Fairness Inquiry and the "Law of Satisfaction-A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 349, 440-41 (1995) (contending that the best explanation for the Allegheny
decision is that it would have been immoral to allow the estate to avoid the obligation).
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the rich doctrinal and historical context-especially the debate
over section 90.
Two contemporaneous case notes describe the reliance discussion as the holding of the case," a simplistic reading
seemingly precluded by the opinion itself.'0 Other case notes,
and some modern commentaries, describe the discussion of

promissory estoppel as dictum."s Although this concept represents an architectural device, it is far too crude to describe the
artistic aspect of Cardozo's opinion.
Some early commentators described the reliance discussion
as an alternative holding,' a theme Leon Lipson took as the
starting point for his celebrated comments on Allegheny College:
When we look at the... argument in the opinion, we are
reminded... of an[] image ... suggested a hundred years
before Allegheny College by that odd and engaging logician,
Richard Whately, sometime later to be Archbishop of Dublin....
Whenever
[Cardozo's] argument emphasizing
consideration runs thin, he moves on to promissory estoppel;
whenever his hints in favor of promissory estoppel approach
the edge of becoming a committed ground of decision, he veers
off in the direction of consideration. Arguments that oscillate
in this way, repeatedly promoting each other by alternation,
bring to mind Whately's simile of "the optical illusion effected
by that ingenious and philosophical toy called the
Thaumatrope: in which two objects are painted on opposite
sides of a card,-for instance, a man and a horse, [orn-a bird
and a cage"; the card is fitted into a frame with a handle, and
the two objects are, "by a sort of rapid whirl [of the handle],
presented to the mind as combined in one picture-the man

279.

See Recent Cases, 13 IOWA L. REV. 345, 349 (1928); IOWA NOTE, supra note

65, at 332. Even Corbin claimed this was the holding of the case. See Corbin,
Cardozo, supra note 245, at 435.
280. Refer to notes 254-56 supra and accompanying text (asserting that bargain
was the specific ground for the decision in favor of the plaintiff)
281. See JOHN D. CALAMAIU & JOSEPH M. PERILLo, THE LAW OF COTACTS 280
n.67 (3d ed. 1987); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACT § 2.19 n.16 (1982);
FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 270, at 102-03; MURPHY & SPEIDEL, supra note
251, at 79; FARNSWORTH, supra note 83, at 368; Carver, supra note 65, at 272; MINNESOTA NOTE, supra note 65, at 643-44. According to Thomas Crandall and Douglas
Whaley, "[Cardozo] does not base his decision on promissory estoppel, but he is anxious to establish the doctrine in New York." CRANDALL & WHALEY, supra note 276,
at 42. For a similar opinion, see CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL,
TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALs 36 (3d
ed. 1993).
282.
See Humble, supra note 65, at 38; VIRGINIA NOTE, supra note 161, at 218
n.23 ("[It seems doubtful whether the (decision was] based upon contract or promissory estoppel."). According to Ian Macneil, "Cardozo waffled as was his wonL" IAN
MACNEIL, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CONTRACTS EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS
AND RELATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 5-3 (2d ed. 1978).
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on the horse's back, the bird in the cage."
Now what were the objects painted on the opposite sides
of Judge Cardozo's Thaumatrope? His trouble was that on the
consideration side he had a solid rule but shaky facts; on the
promissory estoppel side he had a shaky rule but (potentially)
solid facts. He twirled the Thaumatrope in order to give the
impression that he had solid facts fitting a solid rule. Some
lawyers think that what emerges instead is a picture of a bird
on a horse's back.'
Lipson's view is unpersuasive given the context provided in
the previous three subparts. It may well be the case that if one
accepts the Thaumatrope metaphor, then one is left with the
"picture of a bird on a horse's back."2" However, the
observation only leads one to the conclusion that the self-conscious rhetorical craftsman described in subpart III(A) could not
have been employing this metaphor in the first place. Indeed,
there was no need to employ such a technique. As long ago as
1854, New York courts had acknowledged that they were "anxious, to discover a consideration" in charitable subscription
cases." 5 They had been known to make "ingenious" use of the
available facts." 6 As indicated in subpart III(C), the New

283.

Lipson, supra not 51, at 11 (third alteration in original). One commentator

has applied Lipson's analysis to the earlier De Cicco opinion. See Davis, supra note
120, at 777 (arguing that the Thaumatrope metaphor applies to Cardozo's doctrinal
discussion in De Cicco as well).
Lipson did discuss an "ironic deference," but in the context of his oscillatory
theory. The paragraph immediately preceding the one quoted in the text is as follows:
One could note other literary/rhetorical features of Judge Cardozo's opinion,
such as the ironic deference that he pays (on the way to subversion) to the
textbook learning on the doctrine of consideration (classic form of statement,
classic doctrine, supplementary gloss, ancient rigor, expansion of moulds,
compendious formula, and so on). When these phrases are combined with
the substantive effect of the court's ruling, we get a picture of a virtuoso,
playing a piece of his own composition while seated at two keyboards. On
the right keyboard, he plays the music of legal doctrine, sedate and precise.
On the left keyboard he plays the music of social progress, sprightly and a
bit trendy. To that part of the audience that prefers the first keyboard, he
says, "Don't begrudge the attention my left hand is giving to the other keyboard, for I am also playing what you know and like"; to the part of the
audience that prefers the second keyboard, he says, "You and I both know
where my heart is, but just listen to the dexterity with which I play on the
first keyboard for the people who like that sort of thing and who do not
appreciate the sinister beauty of what my left hand does."
Lipson, supra note 51, at 11.
284.
Id.
285.
Barnes v. Perine, 12 N.Y. 18, 24 (1854).
286.
See Billig, supra note 201, at 470 (remarking that New York courts were
stretching the facts in cases to fit them into bargain doctrine); see also Note, 8 CORNELL L.Q. 57, 60-61 (1922) (describing a 1901 New York charitable subscription case
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York courts were not unusual in either regard.' One commentator analyzing American cases could state in 1927 that
such machinations "no longer excites more than a surface ripple
on the judicial sea."' It was apparently the case that the
more typical approach in New York courts was to find a unilateral contract, but bilateral contracts were by no means unHence, it does not seem reasonable that Cardozo
usual.'
would feel obliged to alternate theories because the bargain

facts were weak. In any case, some commentators have suggested that in actuality the reliance facts were weak.' Finally,
Lipson's view does not incorporate the debate over section 90
described in subpart III(B). I Indeed, Lipson's reading has
Cardozo ignoring the situation altogether.
According to Alfred Konefsky, Lipson's oscillatory view is a
"misreading."2" For Konefsky, Cardozo sees reliance in expan-

sion-of-consideration terms, presenting it as part of the continuing evolution of the consideration theory so as to prepare the

in which the court went out of its way to find a bargain).
287. Refer to notes 200-08 supra and accompanying text (describing the treatment of charitable subscription cases).
288. Billig, supra note 201, at 473; see IOWA NOTE, supra note 65, at 332 (stating that at the time Allegheny College was decided, many courts commonly indulged
in "fictions and unfortunate analogies" to find consideration).
289. See Snyder, supra note 208, at 34-36.
290. According to Murray:
There is more than a suspicion that Judge Cardozo recognized a problem in
the application of the detrimental reliance device to the facts of the case,
i.e., that no particular reliance by the College could be shown. This may be
said to have forced him to find consideration which he discovers in typical
Cardozo fashion, by creatively circumventing any lack of bargained-for-exchange and discovering an implied promise by activating the Cardozo implication machine.
MURRAY, supra note 45, at 240 n.94; see also BARNETT, supra note 273, at 392; MURPHY & SPEIDEL, supra note 251, at 79; ROBERT E. SCOrr & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CON-

TRACT LAW AND THEORY 157 (2d ed. 1993) (raising the question whether section 90 of
the Restatement of Contract's requirement that reliance be definite and substantial
made Cardozo reluctant to enforce Johnston's subscription through the doctrine of
promissory estoppel); DAVID H. VERNON, TEACHER'S GUIDE FOR CONTRACTS: THEORY
AND PRAcTIcE 101 (2d ed. 1991); Konefsky, supra note 51, at 683 (noting that it
would be hard to find detrimental reliance on part of the college beyond, perhaps, the
opening of a bank account to deposit Johnston's money).
John Calamari and Joseph Perillo have argued that if the acceptance of a reliance theory results in a narrowing of the application of the bargain theory in charitable subscription cases, then fewer subscriptions are likely to be enforced because in
the majority of cases there is little substantial reliance. See CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 281, at 280-81. The Second Restatement of Contracts deals with this problem directly by stating: "A charitable subscription . . . is binding ... without proof
that the promise induced action or forbearance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 90(2) (1981).
291. See generally Lipson, supra note 51.
292. Konefsky, supra note 51, at 670.
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reader for Cardozo's application of an expanded notion of bargain:
What he has attempted to demonstrate is the manner in
which consideration doctrine has evolved historically. That is
all he is trying to do-provide us with a rather elementary
history lesson ....

Cardozo is not using promissory estoppel at

this point to try to prove that promissory estoppel ought to be
applied in this particular ...

case. Instead, he is using prom-

issory estoppel to show us that there is evidence that traditional consideration doctrine is not as tight as it once was. An
historical argument is being developed. Cardozo is trying to
convince us that the doctrine has responded to some pressure
for change, that it has been infused with notions that perhaps
it originally did not contain, that it has been eroded over
time. As an historical matter, promissory estoppel is only
evidence of that erosion-a stage in the historical advance, an
example of doctrinal accommodation. And as he prepares the
foundation, Cardozo is also lending legitimacy to the task that
he is about to undertake. He is going to show by his manipulation of the consideration doctrine that almost anything can
fit into it ....

In establishing the groundwork for the task he

is about to embark on, Cardozo reminds us of the secure pattern of the evolutionary character of legal doctrine. So now
that we know the historical nature of the doctrinal inroads,
we can proceed to an evaluation of what consideration doctrine
can actually do for us today. We have accounted for the wavering293 doctrine. We will now set sail in search of consideration.

Konefsky's reading also is problematic. It is not clear why
Cardozo would have felt obliged to provide a history lesson so
as to prepare the reader for well-known manipulations of
bargain in such cases. Such a history lesson would make sense
as a foray into the Restatement debate over the introduction of
reliance as a nonbargain basis for promissory liability.29 4 What
I argue in this Article, however, is that the rhetorical architecture of Allegheny College is that of the Mark Antony funeral
oration, not a history lesson.295

293. Id. at 670-71. According to John Dawson, William Harvey, and Stanley
Henderson, "Cardozo, in a remarkable effort, shows how an expansive theory of consideration can be constructed." DAWSON ET AL., supra note 53, at 66.
294. Konefsky's article contains hints that Cardozo was interested in nonbargain
bases of promissory liability. Cf Konefsky, supra note 51, at 686-87 (alleging that
Cardozo wished to advance promissory estoppel into the classical law of contract,
and by his Allegheny College opinion, he reinforced the bargain theory while opening
the possibility that promissory estoppel could be found in future cases). However,
there is no mention of the Restatement debate. See id.
295. Konefsky's article is ambiguous in its stance toward Cardozo's ironic defer-
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An interesting reading is provided by Prakash Mehta. For
Mehta, Cardozo is not the illusionist of Lipson or the history
teacher of Konefsky. Rather, he is the Hamlet of Shakespeare:
For our purposes, the significance of Cardozo's opinion is
that it openly conveys the indeterminacy of legal doctrine in
order to establish the result more persuasively. Cardozo makes
sweeping statements about how "the half truths of one generation" become "the whole truths of another." He then uses this
refrain to introduce the complexities of consideration, including the "innovation of promissory estoppel." As quickly as he
canvasses this innovation, Cardozo puts it aside, molding
Johnston's contract into more traditional notions of consideration.
In light of his ultimate reliance on traditional doctrine,
Cardozo's references to promissory estoppel and the other
"public policy" driven modifications of consideration are interesting. To my mind, these references to doctrinal indeterminacy are acknowledgements of legal doubt. At first blush, this
type of "concession" appears unnecessary or, even worse, it
appears to undermine the decision. However, in this case, the
acknowledgements work to persuade, to reinforce the validity
of the "implied promise" that Cardozo ultimately finds.
[H]e is persuasive because he acknowledges what is true:
that law is at times indeterminate, particularly in cases in
which the policies reflected in law are in flux.
Just as Hamlet remains focused on the role of doubt in
moral life, Allegheny College reflects a judge consumed by the
realities of doubt in legal life. Whereas Hamlets is a case of
first impression that calls forth no clear "rule," Cardozo's dilemma in Allegheny College is one in which he must deal with
the circumstances of a consideration doctrine in flux. In both
cases, the acknowledgement of doubt is unnecessary to the
substantive outcome or decision. But without those acknowledgements I do not think we would tap these works for their
beauty. Hamlet's musings do not change the stakes of the
decision he has to make, nor do Cardozo's gymnastics alter
the facts of the case. The musings in Hamlet's case are simply
the charm that draws us to him, and Cardozo's intricately
rationale the sign of legal beauty, or persuasivepatterned
6
ness.2

ence. Compare id. at 662 (noting the ironic deference, suggesting that "one ought
immediately to be suspicious" of Cardozo), with id. at 666 (Is he criticizing New
York's effacement or is he supporting it? It's hard to say. Perhaps he is merging the
categories.").
296. Mehta, supra note 48, at 181-82.
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Aside from the intriguing Shakespearean analogy,2 97
Mehta's reading has a number of problems. As with Lipson and
Konefsky, Mehta has Cardozo's rhetoric primarily serving the
outcome of this case at a time when manipulations of bargain
were by no means uncommon in charitable subscription cases.298 Mehta's analysis also ignores the controversy over section 90.
Grant Gilmore's view of Cardozo's treatment of reliance is
more general than these approaches. According to Gilmore,
Cardozo plays with the reliance theory as a way of showing
"why the broad New York theory of consideration made promissory estoppel an unnecessary and undesirable refinement."2
This interpretation has the advantage of going beyond the facts
of Allegheny College itself, yet it is untenable (that is, mutually
exclusive with the argument presented in this Article) because
it has Cardozo opposing the basic Restatement position that
reliance can provide a nonbargain basis for promissory liability.
In one sense, Gilmore's position is closest to the mark. His
interpretation, however, should be turned on its head. Rather
than playing with the reliance theory as a way of showing why
the New York theory of bargain made the reliance theory undesirable, Cardozo supports the Restatement by playing (in the
sense of Shakespeare's Antony) with the bargain theory as a
way of showing why a restriction to bargain is undesirable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Influential or not, Cardozo certainly was and is eminent, and
I want ... to explain his eminence. Probably the most important factor is the rhetoric of Cardozo's opinions. I include in
this term not only his writing style narrowly conceived but
also the architecture of his opinions ....
The opinions have a
charm that is literary, essayistic-at times theatrical and even
musical.
-Richard Posner3"
At one level, I have provided a reading of Allegheny College
that is sensitive to the historical and doctrinal context of the

297. For an examination of the rhetoric of doubt as a legitimation device in the
context of judicial review, see generally Douglas, supra note 49.
298. Refer to notes 201-08, 286-89 supra and accompanying text (describing the
various theories and manipulations used in these cases).
299. GILMORE, supra note 102, at 129, 143; cf Cunningham, supra note 4, at
1403-04 (describing Cardozo's "resistance toward the doctrine of promissory estoppel").
300. POSNER, supra note 3, at 126-27.
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case. I have argued that Cardozo's opinion was aimed at the
ALI debate on a particular section of the first Restatement of
Contracts and that it represented his attempt to buttress the
Reporter's controversial approach by lending support to the
position that unbargained-for reliance can provide an independent basis for promissory liability. The historical and doctrinal
context renders other readings problematic or untenable.
More importantly, I have used this analysis to elaborate on
a notion of law as a discipline. I have noted that teachers already use Allegheny College to illustrate the scientific and technological components of law. In this Article, I have presented
the opinion in terms of law as an art through an examination
of Cardozo's rhetorical architecture. Viewed in this light, the
case also presents law teachers with an excellent opportunity to
emphasize law's artistic dimension.

